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Article 5

Court-Ordered Law Breaking
U.S. COURTS INCREASINGLY ORDER THE
VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW
Geoffrey Sant†
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the strangest legal phenomenon of the past
decade is the extraordinary surge of U.S. courts ordering
individuals and companies to violate foreign law.1 Indeed, until
fairly recently, it was virtually unheard of for a U.S. court to order
the violation of foreign laws.2 In 1987, a U.S. circuit court even
stated, per curiam, that it was unsure “whether a court may
ever order action in violation of foreign laws” and added “that it
causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law
should order a violation of law, particularly on the territory of
the sovereign whose law is in question.”3 Over the past decade,
however, the phenomenon of court-ordered law breaking has
increased at an exponential rate. Sixty percent of all instances of
courts ordering the violation of foreign laws have occurred in the
last five years.
The question of whether or not to order the violation of
foreign law typically arises in the context of discovery disputes. In
2010, for example, plaintiffs demanded that a bank produce
† Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Special Counsel,
Dorsey & Whitney LLP (elected to partnership effective January 1, 2016); Director of the
Chinese Business Lawyers Association; and President of the Board of Directors of the
New York Chinese Cultural Center. I have litigated a case involving the issues discussed
in this article. I would like to thank Pamina Dexter, William Primps, Geoffrey Miller, and
Ronald Colombo for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also
thank Geoff Stannard, Lily Smith, and the rest of the editorial staff of the Brooklyn Law
Review for their role in editing and preparing this article for publication.
1 Prior to the present article, I wrote an analysis of court-ordered foreign law
breaking in the Second Circuit. See Geoffrey Sant, “Aerospatiale” Factors on Discovery in
Violation of Foreign Laws, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 2014, at 1, 1-4. When reviewing that article
for publication, the editor of the New York Law Journal responded with some surprise,
stating, “it isn’t every day that courts permit violations of any laws.” Email from Elaine
Song, Legal Editor, New York Law Journal, to author (Oct. 27, 2014, 13:26 EST) (on file
with author).
2 See infra Section IV.A.
3 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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financial records from Malaysia in violation of Malaysian laws
protecting bank secrecy and financial privacy.4 In 2011, a litigant
urged a court to order production of a company’s trade secrets in
violation of Swedish law prohibiting disclosure.5 In another recent
case, a defendant sought the production of a confidential file from
the Spanish government that included the results of a criminal
investigation, production of which would violate Spanish criminal
law.6 In each of these cases, the courts ordered the violation of
foreign law, thereby declaring the supremacy of U.S. discovery
over foreign law.
In its 1987 Aérospatiale decision, the Supreme Court
created a five-factor test for courts to use when determining
whether or not to order the violation of foreign law.7 Four of the five
factors in this test require courts to make subjective judgments (for
example, whether the information sought is “important”). But are
U.S. courts actually able to carry out this analysis without being
biased in favor of U.S. discovery? The five-justice majority and
four-justice dissent in Aérospatiale sharply disagreed on this
question, with the dissent warning that trial court decisions would
be riddled with “pro-forum bias.” This article is the first to conduct
a statistical analysis of whether the pro-forum bias predicted by the
four-justice Aérospatiale dissent and by numerous commentators
has come true.8 The results are stark. Courts applying the
Aérospatiale test have found each of the subjective factors to weigh
in favor of U.S. discovery (that is, in favor of violating foreign law)
by a ratio of at least four to one. Moreover, courts have concluded
that two of the subjective factors favor violating foreign law by a
ratio of at least ten to one. Such lopsided results seem to confirm
the existence of “pro-forum bias.”9
Often, U.S. courts make their pro-forum bias explicit,
stating that they are ordering the violation of foreign laws because
of “the United States’ interests in vindicating the rights of
American plaintiffs.”10 This remarkable assertion contradicts the

4 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL
808639, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
5 AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08-1512 (RMB/AMD), 2011 WL
1421800, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011).
6 Reino de España v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE,
2006 WL 2239641, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006).
7 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
8 See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
9 Part III will analyze the lopsided results of the Aérospatiale test.
10 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th
Cir. 1992); Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL
6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011) (quoting this language); In re Air Crash at
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widespread expectation that justice is blind to such things as the
nationality of the parties. The focus by courts on the nationality of
the parties—treating litigant nationality as a justification for
ordering the violation of foreign laws—is both disturbing and
disrespectful to foreign sovereigns.
Not only does there seem to be pro-forum bias in favor of
U.S. discovery, but an analysis of all results in the United States
suggests that courts might have an additional, deeper bias
against non-Western nations. U.S. courts were over 50% more
likely to find that any given factor weighed in favor of the laws of
a Western nation as compared to a non-Western nation.11
The harms caused by pro-forum bias do not halt at the
decisions themselves. Just as striking as the pro-forum bias is the
exponential growth in the number of litigants requesting that
courts order foreign law breaking. There were 2,500% more cases
seeking the production of documents in violation of foreign law in
the past 10 years than in the first 10 years after the Aérospatiale
ruling.12 U.S. courts are largely responsible for the phenomenon of
court-ordered foreign law breaking. Their willingness to order the
production of documents in violation of foreign law seems to have
greatly encouraged litigants to demand these documents. Litigants
increasingly use court orders to trap opponents between conflicting
laws, thereby forcing an unwarranted settlement. For example,
litigants will demand unneeded documents that cannot be
produced without violating foreign law. This litigation strategy
traps the other party between violating the laws of its home nation
and a U.S. court order. In this way, crafty litigants can force the
other side to settle in order to avoid violating the laws of one
nation. In addition to individual instances of litigation abuse,
court-ordered violations of foreign law create international rancor
and encourage foreign governments to retaliate by requiring the
production of privileged or protected U.S. documents.13
In short, courts are increasingly ordering the violation of
foreign laws. These court orders often occur in the context of
discovery disputes, with parties seeking the production of
documents from foreign nations that cannot be produced without
violating those nations’ laws. Courts generally apply the fivefactor Aérospatiale test when determining whether or not to
Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 379 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2002)
(partially quoting this language).
11 See infra notes 258-266 and accompanying text. At this point in time, there
is an insufficient number of cases to determine that this difference is statistically
significant. The results, however, are suggestive. The harms caused by pro-forum bias
are analyzed in Part IV.
12 This extraordinary, exponential increase is presented in chart form in Part IV.
13 See infra Sections IV.B, IV.D.
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order the production of documents in violation of foreign law.
But the Aérospatiale test requires courts to make numerous
subjective judgments, and the empirical analysis below
demonstrates that courts are unable to apply the Aérospatiale
test without pro-forum bias. Parts I and II of this article discuss
the problematic history of Aérospatiale and its much-criticized
five-factor test. Part III analyzes how courts have applied the
five-factor Aérospatiale test. Part IV presents a statistical
analysis of the application of this test in U.S. courts and
concludes that there is overwhelming evidence of pro-forum bias.
Finally, in Part V, the article suggests that the five-factor
Aérospatiale test should be modified to ameliorate pro-forum
bias, or in the alternative, U.S. courts should adopt a Hague
Convention first approach, in order to stop the alarming trend of
U.S. courts ordering the violation of foreign law.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S AÉROSPATIALE RULING

“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system
beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise
to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation
and litigation in the United States.”14
Civil litigation in the United States permits broad
discovery.15 Litigants generally must produce not only relevant
and admissible evidence, but also any information that could lead
to admissible evidence.16 This broad discovery contrasts sharply
with other legal systems, such as those in continental Europe,
where discovery is generally minimal and parties are expected to
supply their own evidence.17 Civil law nations, like those in
Europe, view evidence taking as a governmental function that
should be performed by the judiciary.18 Attempts by U.S. litigants
to gather evidence abroad for U.S. litigation have been viewed as
usurping foreign sovereignty, similar to how the U.S. might view

14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442, Reporter’s Note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
15 See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978);
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
17 See Patricia Anne Kuhn, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The
Supreme Court’s Misguided Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 1011, 1014 (1989); see also John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and Procedural
Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Harmonization of Civil and Common
Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 455, 462 (2012).
18 Gary B. Born, The Hague Convention Revisited: Reflections on its Role in
U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 83 (1994).
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it if foreign nations set up their own prosecutors or police within
the United States.19
In the mid-1900s, with foreign opposition to U.S. discovery
hampering efforts at international litigation and damages
collection, the United States pushed for an international treaty
that would allow U.S. litigants to gather evidence from foreign
nations.20 The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad
created formal procedures by which litigants in the United States
(and elsewhere) could obtain documents and testimony from
foreign states.21 In order to ensure that the United States would
respect and follow the Hague Convention procedures, many
nations passed “blocking statutes.”22 Blocking statutes made it a
crime to collect evidence (other than through the Hague
Convention) within the foreign nation for use in litigation outside
that nation.23 Unilateral collection of evidence within foreign
nations now not only offended those nations’ sovereignty, it also
violated their laws.
When conducted outside the framework of the Hague
Convention, U.S. discovery abroad could potentially violate not
only blocking statutes, but also the substantive foreign laws that
prohibit the release of certain specific kinds of sensitive
information. For example, most nations have financial privacy and
bank secrecy laws to protect sensitive personal and business
information.24 These substantive laws were created for independent
public policy reasons and not merely to block U.S. discovery.
In the United States, the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law created a five-part test25 for use in resolving
19 See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Practical
Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention, at 4 (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter Draft
Practical Handbook]; Comment, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters: The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery
Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1464-65 (1984) (citing Report of the United States
Delegation to the Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private International Law, 8
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 785, 806 (1969)).
20 CONVENTION ON TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 92-25, at
3 (1972) (Statement of Carl F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dept. of State); see
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 549 (1987) (5-4 decision) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting this fact).
21 See, e.g., Draft Practical Handbook, supra note 19, at 4. In a nutshell, the
Hague Convention established formal pathways by which a nation—such as the United
States—could formally request that a central authority within a foreign nation gather
and submit evidence for use in litigation.
22 Mark A. Cotter, The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation
Aggravates Foreign Signatories and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery Rules, 6
FLA. J. INT’L L. 233, 243 (1991).
23 Id.
24 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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“conflicting mandates . . . , [where] the regulation of one state
compels the person to violate the mandate of another state.”26
Despite this test, the conflict between U.S. discovery and
foreign laws reached the Supreme Court in 1987 in the case of
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa.27 In Aérospatiale, the
trial and appellate courts refused to require plaintiffs to obtain
documents from France through the procedures outlined in the
Hague Convention (which require sending formal requests to
identified bodies within foreign governments seeking their
assistance in obtaining evidence). Instead, the courts simply
ordered the defendants to produce documents, even though
such production would violate a French blocking statute. The
Supreme Court decision in Aérospatiale focused primarily on
whether lower courts were obligated to proceed through the
Hague Convention when litigants seek documents held abroad.
Due to the existence of the blocking statute, the decision also
touched upon how courts should handle conflicts between U.S.
discovery and foreign law.
It is ironic that many courts now speak of applying the
“Aérospatiale test”28 or the “Aérospatiale factors,”29 considering the
Supreme Court’s decision in Aérospatiale avoided providing such
guidance to courts. The Supreme Court majority specifically
stated that “[w]e do not articulate specific rules to guide this
delicate task of adjudication,”30 and commentators have
universally—and repeatedly—lamented the majority’s “lack of
guidance,”31 its “very little guidance,”32 and its “explicit
refusal . . . to lay down explicit guidance.”33 Summing up the views
of many, one scholar wrote that “[c]learly, Aérospatiale’s failure to
provide a framework for lower courts to utilize . . . is regrettable.”34
The four-justice Aérospatiale dissent too lambasted the majority
for having “missed its opportunity to provide predictable and
Id. at pt. IV, Introductory Note.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
28 See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D.D.C.
2000); In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D. Conn. 1991) (calling it
“the Societe . . . test”).
29 See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL
6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011).
30 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
31 Cotter, supra note 22, at 234, 239.
32 Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention,
38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73, 81 (2003).
33 James Chalmers, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery Inter Partes:
Trial Court Decisions Post-Aérospatiale, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 189, 203 (2000).
34 Id. at 198.
26

27
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effective procedures”35 and its “failure to provide lower courts with
any meaningful guidance.”36
Nevertheless, lower courts attempting to apply the
Aérospatiale ruling could not simply throw up their hands. Many
courts developed a formal three-factor test37 from the high
court’s seemingly generic statement that trial courts should
balance the “particular facts, sovereign interests, and [the]
likelihood that resort to . . . [Hague Convention] procedures will
prove effective.”38 Other courts created a four-factor test, drawing
on other language from Aérospatiale.39 A greater number of lower
courts, however, seized upon a footnote in the majority’s ruling,
which stated that “[t]he nature of the concerns that guide a comity
analysis is suggested by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States.”40 The footnote then proceeded to set out as
“factors . . . relevant to any comity analysis” the same five factors
that the Restatement identified for determining when to order
discovery in violation of foreign law.41 These five factors are: (1)
the importance of the discovery to the litigation; (2) the degree of
specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated
in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of
obtaining the information; and (5) the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important U.S.
interests or the interests of the state where the information is
located.42 In some circuits, courts consider other factors in
addition to these five.43
35 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
36 Id. at 548.
37 See, e.g., Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn.
1997); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., October 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295,
309 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
38 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544.
39 See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir.
1998); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (each following a
four-factor test consisting of “(1) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are
in conflict; (2) the hardship of compliance . . . ; (3) the importance to the litigation of the
information . . . ; and (4) the good faith of the party resisting discovery”).
40 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28. For examples of courts applying the
five-factor test from the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, see infra note 104.
41 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
42 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (1987).
43 See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468,
1475 (9th Cir. 1992) (identifying additional factors, including “the extent and the
nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose upon the person”
and “the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state”); Strauss v.
Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 454-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (identifying as additional
factors (1) the good faith of the party resisting discovery; and (2) the hardship of
compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought).
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The Aérospatiale balancing test for ordering foreign law
breaking was controversial and criticized from the get-go. The
four-justice dissent, led by Justice Blackmun, believed it was
grossly inappropriate (“an affront” to foreign nations44) for U.S.
trial courts to decide which foreign laws were worthy of being
followed. The dissent’s “fear” was that trial courts would begin
“issuing discovery orders . . . in a raw exercise of their jurisdictional
power” and cause harm to international comity.45 Commentators
too “have almost uniformly condemned the opinion,”46 with Russell
Weintraub writing caustically of the opinion’s “xenophobia” and
the “outrage” it provoked.47 Patrick J. Borchers describes the
“Aérospatiale case, and its subsequent history” as “monuments
to . . . failure”48 distinguished by “so unconvincing”49 reasoning.
In addition to the general concern about international
comity, however, the dissent, commentators, and even the
Aérospatiale majority all expressed a more practical concern:
namely, that trial “courts are generally ill equipped to assume the
role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our
own.”50 U.S. trial courts, after all, have a “cognitive bias in favor of
U.S. discovery.”51 Trial courts manage U.S. discovery on a day-today basis, and it is natural for them to highly value the
importance of that discovery. The Aérospatiale dissent stated that
“pro-forum bias is likely to creep into the supposedly neutral
balancing process and courts not surprisingly often will turn to
the more familiar procedures established by their local rules.”52
This natural bias in favor of U.S. discovery, combined with
unfamiliarity with foreign laws, creates “a large risk” that the
“case-by-case comity analysis . . . will be performed inadequately.”53
The dissent concluded that “courts are not well designed”54 to
undertake the Aérospatiale comity analysis, especially because
“relatively few judges are experienced in the area and the

44 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
45 Id. at 548.
46 Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards
When Construing Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and Service
Conventions, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 460-61, 470 (1993).
47 Id. at 460-61, 470-71.
48 Borchers, supra note 32, at 74.
49 Id. at 81.
50 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51 See Sant, supra note 1, at 2.
52 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
53 Id. at 548.
54 Id. at 551.
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procedures of foreign legal systems are often poorly understood.”55
Justice Blackmun pointed to recent U.S. trial court decisions as
proof of courts’ “parochial views” and pro-forum bias.56
The Aérospatiale majority recognized the danger of proforum bias but apparently believed that this danger could be
avoided by simply exhorting trial courts to avoid bias and to treat
“foreign litigants . . . [with] the most careful consideration.”57 The
majority repeatedly urged trial courts to take pains “to prevent
discovery abuses,” to “prevent improper uses of discovery
requests,” and to “demonstrate due respect” for “any sovereign
interest” of a foreign state—a “delicate task.”58 The majority called
on courts to “supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely,”
and “exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the
danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may
place them in a disadvantageous position.”59
Did these exhortations succeed? Commentators have
said no, criticizing Aérospatiale’s “confusing and unworkable
standard” in which trial courts are expected to “balance” the
interests of the United States and the foreign government.60
Others have stated that the “supposed protection” of the caseby-case reasonableness approach “was largely illusory.”61
Patrick J. Borchers called trial court implementation of the
ruling “disappointing”62 and “disturbing.”63 It appears that proforum bias has proven too invidious for courts to avoid.
Despite the lack of a statistical analysis of court cases
applying the Aérospatiale test, commentators have been highly
skeptical of courts’ ability to avoid pro-forum bias. One writes that
“[i]t is far from clear that domestic courts are suited for carrying
out the balancing exercise required.”64 Another condemns the
“case-by-case comity analysis” as “subject to a great deal of abuse
by local courts.”65 The need has long existed for a statistical
Id. at 552.
Id. at 568.
57 Id. at 546.
58 Id.
59 Id. For its part, the dissent stated that it was “encouraged by the extent to
which the Court emphasizes the importance of foreign interests and by its admonition
to lower courts to take special care to respect those interests.” Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 Abigail West, Comment, A Meaningful Opportunity to Comply, 63 U. KAN.
L. REV. 189, 212, 215 (2014).
61 Borchers, supra note 32, at 79.
62 Id. at 82.
63 Id. at 84. He adds that “[m]ost of the American commentary [discussing
the standard] has been negative.” Id. at 79.
64 Chalmers, supra note 33, at 207, 214.
65 Steven R. Swanson, Comity, International Dispute Resolution Agreements,
and the Supreme Court, 21 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 333, 365 (1990).
55

56
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analysis to determine whether or not pro-forum bias exists. Early
commentators noted that Justice Blackmun’s fear of “pro-forum
bias” remained “of course speculative.”66 Some, including Adair
Dyer, the First Secretary of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, called for an empirical
analysis of the cases applying the Aérospatiale test.67
Many commentators have claimed to discern pro-forum
bias based on anecdotal evidence, but no commentator has
attempted a statistical analysis. For example, one author remarked
that U.S. courts “[b]alancing foreign sovereign interests against
U.S. interests . . . invariably find that U.S. interests take
precedence,” but the author only cited to three cases.68 Another
author claimed that “prediction of a pro-forum bias . . . was borne
out by lower court decisions,” citing to five cases.69 Another author
reported anecdotally upon “a general trend in which courts
demonstrate a pro-forum bias, often choosing to compel evidence
disclosure under the Federal Rules even when doing so would
violate foreign law.”70 This same author acknowledged, however,
that her anecdotal reports “are not meant to be an exhaustive
study.”71 The fullest analysis to date was conducted in 2003 by an
author who “review[ed] Aérospatiale’s progeny to determine
whether the [Aérospatiale] test has proved to be . . . effective,”
concluding that “for the most part, it has not.”72 This author’s indepth and helpful analysis discussed 11 “representative cases.”73
Nevertheless, the author chose not to attempt a statistical analysis
of the results.74
Putting aside the lack of statistical analysis, the
overwhelming sense from observers and commentators is that
U.S. courts have a “clear bias”75 and an “inherent institutional
66 George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme
Court: A Critique of the Aérospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 542 (1989).
67 See Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International
Standards When Construing Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and
Service Conventions, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 464 (1993) (“The practical results of the
decision therefore can only be discerned through analysis of the subsequent cases
applying the court’s approach in Aérospatiale.” (citing Adair Dyer, Permanent Bureau
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Checklist for the Discussions of
the Special Commission of April 1989 on the Operation of the Hague Conventions on the
Service of Process Abroad and on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, Preliminary
Document No. 1 (Mar. 1989))).
68 Chalmers, supra note 33, at 206.
69 Cotter, supra note 22, at 234, 240.
70 West, supra note 60, at 207.
71 Id. at 211.
72 Borchers, supra note 32, at 74.
73 Id. at 82-84.
74 Id.
75 Chalmers, supra note 33, at 203.
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inability” to act as neutral arbiters of national interests.76 Authors
have also discerned a trend in which “courts in the United States
have become more willing to impose severe sanctions for failure to
comply with discovery orders generally.”77 Others state that “the
heavy preponderance of [cases] simply authorize[ ] discovery
under local procedures,”78 accusing “judicial systems of . . .
customarily protect[ing] the interests of their own citizens in
international disputes by resolving in their favor the procedural
conflicts.”79 The Supreme Court has noted the “tendency on the
part of courts, perhaps unrecognized, to view a dispute from a local
perspective,”80 and one appellate court commented that “courts
inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign
interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to
be favored over foreign interests.”81
There has long been a need for an exhaustive empirical
analysis of the Aérospatiale test’s statistical results to determine
whether the predictions and anecdotal reports of pro-forum bias
are correct. The remainder of this article analyzes attempts by
U.S. courts to implement the five-factor test in the context of
possibly ordering violations of foreign law. The evidence of proforum bias is clear.
II.

THE AÉROSPATIALE TEST, TESTED: OVERWHELMING PROFORUM BIAS

For this article, I conducted an empirical analysis of
every U.S. trial court to apply the Aérospatiale five-factor test.
The results show that U.S. courts have been lopsided in finding
that the factors favor violating foreign laws.
The five Aérospatiale factors consist of one objective factor
and four subjective factors. The subjective factors—which require
courts to decide such things as the degree of “importance” of
certain desired discovery—have been overwhelmingly resolved in
favor of violating foreign law. Courts have found each subjective
factor to favor violating foreign law by a ratio of at least four to
76 Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Aérospatiale
Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INT’L LAW. 393, 404 (1990).
77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 442, reporter note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also West, supra note 60, at
207 (discussing the “general trend”).
78 Borchers, supra note 32, at 82.
79 Swanson, supra note 65, at 333.
80 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 553 (1987).
81 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
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one.82 For two of the subjective factors, courts found the factor to
favor violating foreign laws by a ratio of at least ten to one.83
These lopsided results call into question whether courts have
weighed the factors correctly and whether U.S. courts are even
capable of conducting the balancing test required by Aérospatiale.
But while both the Aérospatiale dissent and commentators
recognized the likelihood of pro-forum bias, one poisonous side
effect of pro-forum bias was unforeseen: the exponential increase
in U.S. litigants’ requests that courts order foreign law breaking.
The willingness of courts to order foreign law breaking has
created a snowball effect. As courts increasingly order foreign law
breaking, litigants respond by requesting even more of these
orders. By demanding documents that the other side cannot
produce, litigants trap the other side between a U.S. court order
and foreign law. Discovery becomes a weapon, and the trapped
entity can be forced into an unwarranted settlement or evidentiary
sanctions. By way of example, one nonparty bank that refused to
violate foreign financial privacy laws was ordered by a U.S. court
to pay $10,000 every day it failed to comply with the order as a
“coercive fine.”84 Eventually, the bank—a nonparty to the original
litigation—agreed to pay a $250,000 settlement to the plaintiffs.85
The number of cases in which litigants use court-ordered
violations of foreign law as a strategic weapon has grown
exponentially. Between 2005 and 2014, there were 2,500% more
cases in which litigants requested the violation of foreign law as
compared to the first 10 years after the Aérospatiale ruling.86 Such
enormous growth strongly implies that a shift in litigation strategy
has occurred; trial courts have thus unwittingly encouraged the
“discovery abuses” that the Aérospatiale majority warned against.87
Pro-forum bias is especially invidious. Bias cannot be
easily corrected because “the limited appellate review of
interlocutory discovery decisions . . . prevents any effective case-

See infra Sections III.B, III.E.
See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
84 Order, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK),
2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010).
85 Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion,
No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010).
86 See infra Section IV.A. These statistics are based on the number of cases
during each time period that utilized the Aérospatiale five-factor test to determine whether
or not to violate foreign law. In the first decade after the Aérospatiale ruling, only two cases
applied the five-factor Aérospatiale test in the context of possibly ordering the violation of
foreign law; in the past 10 years, there were 50 such cases. As discussed elsewhere in this
article, not all courts applying Aérospatiale use the five-factor test.
87 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
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by-case correction of erroneous discovery decisions.”88 Due to the
U.S. system in which courts defer to precedent, courts cite to and
repeat decisions tainted with pro-forum bias. One commentator
discussed the problem of “widespread and self-reinforcing” court
orders violating foreign law, in which “courts justify one ipse dixit
with citation of another in seemingly endless chains.”89 Courts’
natural tendency towards pro-forum bias, combined with few or
no opportunities for appellate court correction, and compounded
by U.S. deference to precedent, has caused not just a snowball
effect, but an avalanche of bad law.
As court-ordered law breaking has become common,
foreign governments have begun to express outrage. The
Kingdom of Jordan recently filed its first-ever amicus brief 90 to a
U.S. court, declaring that “it feels compelled to do [so] given the
grave affront to its sovereignty”91 by a court order requiring the
violation of its laws. In 2015, a court in the United Kingdom
turned U.S. discovery abuse on its head, ordering the revelation of
a sealed U.S. court document regarding an ongoing Department of
Justice investigation.92 Although the U.K. court did not explicitly
state that its decision was retaliation for abusive U.S. court orders,
one suspects that U.S. violations of foreign sovereignty have made
foreign courts less respectful of U.S. sovereignty.
Foreign governments and regulators who wish to take
mercy on companies trapped between foreign law and U.S. court
orders have unwittingly worsened the situation. Many foreign
regulators have used their prosecutorial discretion by not
punishing companies for having obeyed U.S. court orders that
required foreign law breaking. Yet this lack of enforcement has
emboldened courts to conclude that foreign governments do not
take these laws seriously. One U.S. court recently asserted that
“[i]f a given country truly values its national policy of, say,
criminalizing compliance with a U.S. court subpoena, it will
prosecute its citizens for so complying.”93 This judge essentially
demanded that foreign governments fine and imprison people for
complying with U.S. court orders. “This method of reasoning
appears to place banks [and companies] in a precarious position—

Id. at 554 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chalmers, supra note 33, at 201.
90 Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Amicus Curiae the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan at 1, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 134 S. Ct. 2869 (2014) (No. 121485), 2013 WL 3830458, at *1.
91 Id. at 2.
92 Prop. All. Grp. Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2015] EWHC 321 (Ch).
93 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
88

89
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the only way they can prove they will be sanctioned is if they are
actually sanctioned first.”94
Considering the many harms caused by pro-forum bias,
it is deeply problematic that it is so ingrained in U.S. trial
court practice. And as demonstrated below, pro-forum bias is
evident from the lopsided margins by which courts find that
each of the Aérospatiale test’s subjective factors weigh in favor
of violating foreign laws.
III.

CASES APPLYING THE AÉROSPATIALE FIVE-FACTOR TEST

The Aérospatiale five-factor test requires U.S. trial courts
to weigh the need for U.S. discovery against deference to foreign
law. Yet because the primary day-to-day role of U.S. courts is to
manage discovery, the Aérospatiale test essentially requires
courts to weigh the value of their own work against the value of
foreign laws. Trial courts naturally have a cognitive bias in favor
of U.S. discovery. One commentator notes that “balancing
approaches almost always have an inherent bias favoring the
forum state’s laws.”95 As stated in one recent analysis, “[i]t is no
surprise that U.S. courts usually find that U.S. discovery wins in
this comparison—but it is surprising just how lopsided the results
are.”96 As it turns out, application of the Aérospatiale balancing
test isn’t balanced at all.
To conduct the analysis for this article, I reviewed every
U.S. decision to cite and apply the Aérospatiale five-factor test
in the context of considering whether to order the production of
information where that production was prohibited by foreign
law. For each case that applied the Aérospatiale five-factor test,
I analyzed and calculated the court’s conclusions as to each of
the five factors. While this study therefore does not include
every case citing to or applying an Aérospatiale “test,” it does
consider every case to apply the full five-factor test in the
context of possibly ordering violations of foreign law.
My analysis is limited in three ways. First, I restricted it
to cases that analyzed whether or not to order the violation of
foreign law. (I excluded many cases in which the Aérospatiale test
was applied to other situations, such as whether or not to issue a
letter rogatory.97) Second, I limited my analysis to cases applying
West, supra note 60, at 209-10.
Swanson, supra note 65, at 362.
96 See Sant, supra note 1, at 2.
97 See, e.g., Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. C10-861RSM,
2014 WL 202102 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2014); Seoul Semiconductor Co. Ltd. v. Nichia
Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Tex. 2008). Both of these cases involved requests for a
94

95
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the Aérospatiale five-factor test. (As noted above, some courts
have applied a three-factor Aérospatiale test98 or a four-factor
test.99 I did not include these cases, which involve different factors
and different lines of interpretation from those in the five-factor
test.) Third, I only analyzed cases that provided the results of all,
or at least most, of the five factors. In a number of cases, the
courts “simply . . . announce” the overall result of the Aérospatiale
analysis, “with little further explanation.”100 Because the
calculations below rely on a comparison of the results for specific
individual factors, I excluded cases that did not provide these
results. Where courts provided results for some but not all factors,
I included cases that analyzed at least four factors101 and excluded
cases that analyzed fewer than a majority of factors.102
In some instances, courts stated that they would treat a
certain factor as neutral.103 These cases were included in the
analysis, but neutral factors were excluded when calculating the
letter rogatory. As a letter rogatory does not involve the violation of foreign law, these
cases were excluded from the calculations.
98 See, e.g., Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn.
1997); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., October 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295,
309 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
99 First American Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir.
1998); Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (each following a
four-factor test consisting of (1) competing interests of the nations whose laws are in
conflict; (2) the hardship of compliance; (3) the importance to the litigation of the
information; and (4) the good faith of the party resisting discovery).
100 Borchers, supra note 32, at 84.
101 See, e.g., In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL
3636925 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012); Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991). In
Chevron, the court analyzed all factors but the first (importance), which the court seems to
have skipped by accident. The court actually states at one point that it is addressing “the
first two factors” of the Aérospatiale test, but the court only says that the information
request “is fairly specific and relatively narrow in scope”—an analysis that addresses factor
two (specificity) but not factor one (importance). Chevron, 2012 WL 3636925, at *12. The
court’s wording implies that it found factor one (like factor two) to weigh in favor U.S.
discovery, but the court is not explicit. Id. This article includes Chevron’s analysis of factors
two through five in the calculations discussed below, but excludes factor one. See id.
Similarly, in Doster, the court mentions the third Aérospatiale factor (whether the
information originated in the United States) in passing but does not analyze it. Doster, 141
F.R.D. at 52. The other four Aérospatiale factors are analyzed and included in the
calculations below.
102 For example, in In re Baycol Products Litigation, the court stated that the first
two factors of the Aérospatiale test weighed in favor of U.S. discovery, but it did not analyze
the other three factors. See In re Baycol Products Litigation, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1060 (D.
Minn. 2004) (stating only that “the requested documents, purporting to relate to the
withdrawal of Baycol from the worldwide market, are relevant and important to this
litigation”). Because the court did not apply all five factors of the Aérospatiale test, the case
was not included in these calculations. Other times, a case may mention the Aérospatiale
test but not provide individualized analysis of the factors. See, e.g., Rosales v. Fitflop USA,
LLC, No. 11cv973-W(KSC), 2013 WL 941729 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). These cases were
excluded from the calculations.
103 See, e.g., SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 776 F. Supp. 2d. 323, 337 (N.D. Tex.
2011) (treating the fifth factor as neutral).
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percentage of cases that weigh in favor of violating foreign law.104
Some circuits have developed additional factors to be
considered,105 which are not discussed in this article. As the
foregoing makes clear, the cases analyzed here do not represent
every case to apply Aérospatiale in the context of potentially
ordering the violation of foreign law. They are limited to cases
applying the five-factor test and meeting the other requirements
set forth above. In addition to these restrictions, my analysis
focuses solely on how trial courts apply the Aérospatiale test.
Geoffrey Miller points out that U.S. regulators frequently demand
information that would violate foreign law if disclosed, but these
cases are rarely litigated because the regulated company faces too
much risk.106 Thus, the problem of companies being forced to
produce evidence by branches of the U.S. government is much
more common than even indicated here.
Ultimately, I found 56 cases that applied Aérospatiale in
determining whether or not to order the violation of foreign law
and analyzed each or most of the individual factors.107 Based on
104 In other words, when calculating the percentage of cases that ordered the
violation of foreign law, there are different denominators for some of the five factors.
105 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
106 I thank Geoffrey Miller for this insight. Email from Geoffrey Miller,
Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, NYU Law School, to author (June 13, 2015,
16:37 EST) (on file with author). A government regulator stated, at the Thirty-Third
Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime, “Don’t talk to me about bank secrecy laws.
I don’t want to hear about them.” Personal communication to author (Sept. 9, 2015).
107 The cases I identified as applying Aérospatiale to the context of weighing
whether or not to order violations of foreign law (and which provide the results of the court’s
analysis for a sufficient number of factors) are: Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2013); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1992);
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Cathode Ray Tube
(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-05944-SC, 2014 WL 6602711(N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2014); In re
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-05944-SC, 2014 WL 5462496 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 23, 2014); BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, No. 14-cv-01009-WHO, 2014 WL
3965062 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C 075944 SC, 2014 WL 1247770 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 298
F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Eikenberry v. Celsteel Ltd., No. 13 Civ. 4661(AT), 2013 WL
5308028 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2013); CE Int’l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P’ship,
No. 12-CV-08087(CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013); Pershing Pac. W.,
LLC v. Marinemax, Inc., No. 10-cv-1345-L(DHB), 2013 WL 941617 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11,
2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05 Civ.
2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG), 07 Civ. 6563(TPG),
08 Civ. 2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ.6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ.
1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 296 F.R.D.
168 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 293 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Wultz
v. Bank of China, 942 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Application of Chevron Corp.,
No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse,
No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 1918866 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); TruePosition, Inc. v. LM
Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); Lantheus Med.
Imaging v. Zurich Am. Ins., Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Coloplast A/S v.
Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL 6330064 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19,
2011); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper Corp., No. 02 C 6240,
2011 WL 5588764 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP),
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those results, I determined that (1) courts display a pro-forum bias;
(2) there has been an exponential increase in litigants seeking
court-ordered violations of foreign law; and (3) courts might have
an additional bias against non-Western nations. The results of my
statistical analysis for each individual factor are discussed below.
A.

Factor One: Importance

The “importance” factor requires courts to subjectively
weigh “the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or
other information requested.”108 In a sign of possible pro-forum
bias, U.S. courts have found that the factor of “importance”
weighs in favor of violating foreign law by a ratio of ten to one.
According to my study, 91% of courts (49 out of 54) applying the
Aérospatiale five-factor test concluded that the information’s
“importance” justified violating foreign law.
2011 WL 11562419 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011); Stream Sicav v. RINO Int’l Corp., No. CV 1008695-VBF (VBKx), 2011 WL 4978291 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, No.
10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); AstraZeneca LP v. Breath
Ltd., No. 08-1512(RMB/AMD), 2011 WL 1421800 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC
v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D.
Tex. 2011); Devon Robotics v. DeViedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2010 WL 3985877 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
2010); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Discount Antitrust Litig., No. 05MD-1720 (JG)(JO), 2010 WL 3420517 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 27, 2010); Consejo de Defensa del
Estado de la Republica de Chile v. Espirito Santo Bank, No. 09-20613-CIV., 2010 WL
2162868 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2010); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ.
8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs.
Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2010 WL 2976220 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010); In re Air
Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Milliken & Co. v.
Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme
Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV., 2009 WL 3823390 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009); Export-Import Bank
of U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd., No. 0308554 (DCP) (JCF), 2009 WL 1055673
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2009); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 262 F.R.D. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); In re
Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Old Ladder Litig. Co.,
LLC v. Investcorp Bank, B.S.C., No. 08 Civ. 0876(RMB)(THK), 2008 WL 2224292 (S.D.N.Y.
May 29, 2008); Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. De Equip. Medico, No. 07CV-309-L(AJB), 2008 WL 81111 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.,
249 F.R.D. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Abiola v. Abubakar, No. 02 C 6093, 2007 WL 2875493 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 28, 2007); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 242 F.R.D. 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No.
03CIV3573LTSRLE, 2005 WL 1813017 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., MDL No.
1431 (MJD/JGL), 2003 WL 22023449 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2003); Adams v. Unione
Mediterranea Di Sicurta, No. Civ.A. 94-1954, 2002 WL 472252 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2002);
British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90Civ.2370 (JFK)(FM), 2000
WL 713057 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000,
211 F.R.D. 374 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50 (M.D.N.C. 1991); In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2007 WL 8317419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2007); In re
Activision Blizzard, 86 A.3d 531 (Del. Ch. 2014); Buttitta v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. L-959202, 2010 WL 1427273 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 5, 2010); Buttitta v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd.,
No. BER-L-9592-02, 2006 WL 2355200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 16, 2006).
108 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
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Courts have reached such lopsided results in part because
they often (either intentionally or subconsciously) convert the first
factor in the Aérospatiale test from “importance” to “relevance.”109
Mere relevance is a remarkably low standard for ordering the
violation of foreign law. It is also not the standard expressed in
Aérospatiale. Yet courts frequently assert that the first factor
weighs in favor of violating foreign law simply because “the
documents in question fall within the scope of relevant
discovery.”110 Courts have reached this conclusion even when the
defendant points out that the documents sought are not
“important” to the litigation.111 In one case, the court declared that
factor one favored violating foreign law because the documents
requested were “likely to contain information that is of some
relevance to this litigation.”112 The court not only reduced
“importance” to mere “relevance,” but it found that even a
likelihood of “some relevance” outweighs foreign law.113 In another
instance, a court stated that the factor weighed in favor of
violating foreign law after determining that “hundreds of
thousands of e-mails” would be “relevant” to issues of “damages,
royalty, and willfulness.”114 It certainly seems unlikely that of
hundreds of thousands of emails, each one would be “relevant,”
much less “important.”
Even when courts have not explicitly lowered the standard
from “importance” to “relevance,” courts often set a low bar for
“importance.”115 In one instance, a court found that the factor of
“importance” favored violating foreign law where the information
sought would probably be of “significant value in helping Plaintiffs
organize their case and may identify previously undiscovered

109 See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-05944SC,
2014 WL 124770, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (“The Court finds the . . . [document
sought] is relevant . . . . This weighs for production.”); Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel.
Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (“The documents in
question deal with jurisdictional discovery . . . and are relevant discovery.”); In re Air Cargo
Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Payment Card
Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720(JG)(JO), 2010 WL
3420517, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010).
110 In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. at 53
(“Although the defendant disputes the plaintiffs’ characterization that the documents
in question are ‘key’ to the litigation, Air France concedes that the documents in
question fall within the scope of relevant discovery.”).
111 Id.
112 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.,
2010 WL 3420517, at *9 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, No. 14-cv-01009, 2014 WL
3965062, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014).
115 See, e.g., infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
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competitor contacts.”116 Courts might not be taking the balancing
test seriously when they find it “important” to help litigants
“organize their case.”117
In addition to courts’ willingness to order the violation of
foreign law, plaintiffs exacerbate the problem by frequently
utilizing court-ordered law breaking to embark on fishing
expeditions rather than to actually seek documents “important” to
the litigation.118 Courts often approve fishing expeditions that
sweep up financial records from banks even when the purpose of
obtaining the documents is merely to identify potential targets for
suit or identify who can pay damages.119 For example, one court
found “importance” where the documents sought “could
potentially reveal the identities” of additional defendants.120 In
another case, the information sought was an “attempt[ ] to
identify unnamed . . . investors [who] are potentially liable.”121 In
yet another instance, the court found “prime importance” where
the plaintiffs’ lawyers sought financial records to “identify[ ]
business relationships and transactions that may affect the
parties’ ability to satisfy the judgment.”122 In each of these
examples, courts decided that “trolling through people’s financial
records to decide who has enough money to be sued is an
‘important’ reason to violate foreign law.”123
In sum, courts find the first factor of the Aérospatiale test
to weigh in favor of violating foreign law by the overwhelming
ratio of ten to one. This extremely asymmetrical ratio is itself a
strong indication of pro-forum bias. And courts regularly subvert
this test by converting it from a question of “importance” to a
question of mere relevance. Even when courts recognize that this
factor focuses on “importance,” courts regularly find documents
peripheral to the merits of a litigation (such as documents showing
whether a defendant can pay a judgment) to be “important.”

116 In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. C-07-5944-SC, 2014
WL 6602711 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014); In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig.
No. C-07-05944-SC, 2014 WL 5462496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014).
117 In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 6602711; In re
Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 5462496, at *2.
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442, reporter note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Swanson, supra note 65, at 335.
119 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
120 Tiffany LLC v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
121 Old Ladder Litig. Co., LLC v. Investcorp Bank B.S.C., No. 08 Civ.
0876(RMB)(THK), 2008 WL 2224292, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008).
122 Export-Import Bank of U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., No. 03-08554, 2009
WL 1055673, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2009).
123 See Sant, supra note 1.
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Factor Two: Specificity

The second factor of the Aérospatiale test requires
courts to weigh “the degree of specificity of the request.” Courts
have found this factor to weigh in favor of U.S. discovery in
93% of cases (52 out of 56), a ratio of thirteen to one. The
results are even more extreme in the Second Circuit, where
courts have found the specificity factor to weigh in favor of U.S.
discovery in every single one of the 29 cases to consider the
issue.124 It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court intended for
a balancing test to have such lopsided results.
In part, these extreme results are due to confusion over
the meaning of the word “specificity.” While the Supreme Court
apparently intended “specificity” to refer to the degree to which
the request is “narrowly targeted” or “limited in scope,” courts
often interpret this factor as asking whether or not the
documents sought are clearly identified. One recent decision, for
example, stated that “[t]he specificity of the request is also not
seriously disputed since it identifies precisely the group of
documents sought.”125 Likewise, in another case, the document
requests were said to be “sufficiently specific in identifying
documents sought.”126 These courts have interpreted factor two
(“the degree of specificity”) not as asking whether the requests
are narrowly tailored, but rather whether the documents sought
are identified clearly. It would be remarkable if the Supreme
Court really intended that foreign law should be violated in part
because document requests are clearly written.
Presumably, the purpose behind including “specificity” in
the five-factor test is to avoid ordering the violation of foreign law
for the purpose of enabling a fishing expedition. Foreign
governments have long protested U.S. fishing expeditions. As the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law notes, “[t]he objection to
‘fishing expeditions’ . . . [is] often heard in other states in response
124 Id.; see also Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Courts Order More Companies to Break Foreign
Laws, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/12/09/u-s-courtsorder-more-companies-to-break-foreign-laws/ [http://perma.cc/LTB4-9YWW] (discussing
generally the problem of courts overwhelmingly ordering the violation of foreign laws). Since
the publication of my article on Second Circuit cases applying the Aérospatiale factors, one
additional Second Circuit court applied the factors, and it too concluded that the document
requests’ specificity favored violating foreign law. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F.
Supp. 3d 397, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
125 In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 53
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. AntiTrust Litig., No. 06-MD1775, 2010 WL 2976220, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010) (noting that the requests seek
“large volumes of data” but nevertheless finding that “the interrogatories are specific
about the meetings and communications to which they are directed”).
126 Pershing Pac. W., LLC v. Marinemax, Inc., No. 10-cv-1345-L (DHB), 2013
WL 941617, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).
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to United States document requests.”127 Commentators too
recognized that “while ‘fishing expeditions’ are all too common in
the U.S., they are simply not tolerated in other countries.”128 The
Hague Convention reflects a compromise that would permit some
U.S.-style discovery in exchange for halting untethered, offensive
fishing expeditions within foreign sovereigns.129 Yet courts have
interpreted “specificity” so loosely that it has no impact on
limiting these fishing expeditions.
One court found that the specificity factor applied even
though the document request was exceedingly broad and vague.
The defendant company Generic Medical Devices sought “any
document[s] in [plaintiff’s] possession that are responsive to
Generic’s Requests for Production.”130 One might call this
document request rather generic. As the plaintiff correctly
pointed out, this document demand “failed to explicitly state what
documents it requests [the plaintiff] produce.”131 Here, the
document request was neither “narrowly tailored” nor “clear as to
the documents sought.” Nevertheless, the court declared that
“Generic’s request is sufficiently specific and this factor weighs in
favor of production.”132
Even when courts recognize that “specificity” means
“narrowly targeted,” courts still find extremely broad requests to
be “specific.” One court found specificity where the litigant
demanded that the Spanish government turn over “all documents
and things or copies of documents from or forming part of [Spain’s
criminal investigation] file.”133 Another court claimed that
document requests for “hundreds of thousands of emails” were
“specific” and were “not the type of ‘generalized searches for
information’ which are discouraged.”134 It is hard to understand
how a request for hundreds of thousands of emails could ever not
be a generalized search for information.
Even when courts recognize that a document is not
sufficiently specific, courts will often not weigh this factor on the
127 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442, reporter note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); Swanson, supra note 65, at 335.
128 Cotter, supra note 22, at 235.
129 See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence
Convention After Aérospatiale, 38 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 103, 105 (2003).
130 Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL
6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, ABS, No.
03CIV3573LTSRLE, 2005 WL 1813017, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2005).
134 BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, No. 14-Civ-01009, 2014 WL
3965062, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014) (quoting Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling
Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992)).

202

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

side of foreign law. Instead, the court will pare down the
document request to make it palatable to the court. At first
glance, it might seem reasonable for courts to pare down requests,
but in actual practice, this is problematic. If courts simply narrow
the scope of overly broad requests, then litigants feel no pressure
to make narrowly tailored requests in the first place. On the
contrary, litigants are incentivized to make a broad request that
will either be accepted or else trimmed to whatever level the court
will accept.135
Another problem with courts paring down overly broad
requests is that factor two (specificity) will nearly always weigh in
favor of U.S. discovery. This has occurred in the Second Circuit,
where every one of over two dozen cases applying the five-factor
test concluded that the specificity factor favors violating foreign
law. By way of example, one court recently declared that a
request “was not specific enough”136 but nevertheless declared
that, “[b]ecause Plaintiff has to write a new notice of deposition in
accordance with this order, that objection is moot.”137 In another
instance, the “requests . . . were decidedly less specific” but the
court still found this factor to favor violating foreign law because
the court itself “narrowed the scope of the requests considerably.”138
One case in particular highlights both the problem of
courts setting a low bar for finding specificity and the problematic
nature of paring back document requests. In Doster v. Schenk
A.G., the defendant called the plaintiff’s discovery demands
“abusive,” claiming that they “lack specificity, are not reasonably
related to the allegations in the pleadings, and are not of great
importance to the resolution of these disputes.”139 The defendant
“set out many of the interrogatories and requests” which it
considered to be “overly broad,” and the court agreed that “[s]ome
requests are overly expansive and premature.”140 Yet the court
still found that the factor of specificity favored violating foreign
law because “these are precisely the types of requests which could
be winnowed” to become “suitably limited.”141 Later in the fivefactor analysis, the court proceeded to contradict itself. Discussing
factor four (“the availability of alternative means of securing the
135 When the court of its own volition pares back requests to the maximum
extent it deems acceptable, the court is also essentially providing free legal advice to
the requesting party. I thank Pamina Dexter for this helpful comment.
136 Eikenberry v. Celsteel Ltd., No. 13 Civ. 4661(AT), 2013 WL 5308028, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2013).
137 Id.
138 Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
139 Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50, 53 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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information”), the court stated that the documents could not be
easily obtained through other means because “the documents are
numerous,” and “[t]his is not a case where only a few, insubstantial
documents are sought.”142 Thus, when discussing factor four, the
documents sought were deemed overwhelmingly numerous, but
when discussing factor two, the court found that the document
requests were specific. The court therefore contradicted itself, and
both times the court held that the factor favored violating foreign
law. This would seem to be a strong indication of pro-forum bias.
Courts have thus concluded that factor two (specificity)
weighs in favor of violating foreign laws by a ratio of thirteen to
one, an extremely lopsided result that indicates pro-forum bias.
Many courts have misinterpreted the “specificity” factor as
asking whether the document request is clear, as opposed to
whether it is narrowly tailored. Even when courts correctly
interpret the word “specificity,” they claim to find “specificity”
in vague requests and demands for hundreds of thousands of
documents. Worse, by unilaterally paring down document
requests, courts encourage abusively broad document requests.
C.

Factor Three: Origin of Information

Of the five factors of the Aérospatiale test, the only
entirely objective factor is the third one, which asks “whether
the information originated in the United States.” Naturally,
one should expect pro-forum bias (if it exists) to appear in
courts’ analyses of the subjective factors. The objective factor
thus acts as a kind of control group. Hence, it is possible to
roughly determine the pervasiveness of pro-forum bias by
comparing the results of the four subjective factors against the
results of the objective factor.
The difference is stark. The sole objective factor (whether
or not the information sought originated in the United States)
was found to favor violating foreign law in a mere 6% of cases. By
contrast, the four subjective factors were each found by courts to
weigh in favor of violating foreign law in at least 80% of cases.
This extreme dichotomy strongly suggests pro-forum bias.
Moreover, there are indications of pro-forum bias even in courts’
treatment of the objective factor. A few courts acknowledged that
the information sought originated outside the United States, and
yet—in contradiction of the language in Aérospatiale (and the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law)—they still claimed that

142

Id. at 54.
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this objective factor either weighed in favor of violating foreign
law or else was neutral.
For example, in Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la
Republica de Chile v. Espirito Santo Bank, the court acknowledged
that “[c]learly here the information at issue originated in Chile.”143
This should be the end of the matter; the third factor of the
Aérospatiale test asks merely “whether the information originated
in the United States,” and in Espirito Santo Bank, the answer was
no.144 Nevertheless, the court in Espirito Santo Bank made a series
of logical twists to conclude that this fact weighed in favor of
violating Chilean law. After acknowledging that the information
originated in Chile, the court claimed that “the fact [that the
documents originated in Chile] in the unique posture of this case
actually cuts in . . . favor [of U.S. discovery],” supposedly because
the information sought “is so uniquely available” to the foreign
entity that production is even “more necessary.”145 The court’s
analysis turned this factor into a head’s-I-win, tails-you-lose
scenario. If the documents originated in the United States, the
factor would favor U.S. discovery, but because the documents
originated in Chile, the court claimed that production was even
“more necessary.”
In the case of In re Global Power Equipment, the court
acknowledged that “[t]he documents were not created in the
United States” but refused to recognize that this fact weighed
against violating foreign law.146 In Global Power, the requesting
party wanted to depose witnesses who resided in France and
wanted documents, some created in France,147 even though
French law prohibited this discovery.148 These facts should be
enough. But in a bit of logical sleight-of-hand, the court shifted
the focus of factor three from the origin of the information to the
topics of the testimony: the witnesses would be testifying about a
“facility in the Netherlands” and a “dispute . . . between American
and Dutch companies.”149 These points are red herrings; the topic
of the testimony is irrelevant. French sovereignty is implicated
when French residents are forced to testify,150 and the documents
143 Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la Republica de Chile v. Espirito Santo
Bank, No. 09-20613-CIV., 2010 WL 2162868, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2010).
144 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
145 Espirito Santo, 2010 WL 2162868, at *5.
146 In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp., Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 839.
149 Id. at 848.
150 It has long been clear that the affront to sovereignty occurs when a resident of
the country is forced to testify as a witness. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d. 602,
605 (5th Cir. 1985) (German government argued in amicus brief that depositions of German
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from France are barred by French law regardless of their
content.151 The court, however, implied that there was no problem
with violating French law if the witnesses and documents discuss
events that took place outside of France. Even the court appeared
uncomfortable with its analysis; although the court implied that it
was treating this factor as either neutral or as favoring the
violation of foreign law, it does not say so explicitly.152
A similar result occurred when Singapore Airlines was
sued after one of its planes crashed in Taiwan.153 Because its
“principal place of business is Singapore,” the “majority of the
information requested” was “located in Singapore” and “[n]one of
the information requested was created or kept in the United
States,”154 analysis of factor three (the origin of information) should
have been straightforward. The court insisted, however, that
“whether the information originated in the United States” favored
neither party.155 The court reached this conclusion based on a non
sequitur, namely that Singapore Airlines also “conducts regular
flights to and from the United States” and has offices in the United
States.156 There is no logical reason why documents regarding
events in Asia would have originated in the United States simply
because Singapore Airlines also flies to the United States. If the
documents originated in either Singapore or Taiwan, they did not
“originate[ ] in the United States,” as required by the balancing
test.157 Nevertheless, the court claimed that “it is just as likely that
responsive documents may be located in Taiwan, if not the United
States” and from this concluded that the factor was neutral.158
In the examples of the Singapore Airlines case, as well
as Global Power and Espirito Santo Bank, the information
sought originated outside the United States, but the court
witnesses would violate German sovereignty unless Hague Convention procedures were
followed). Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief agreeing with
the German government that the Hague Convention should be used when requiring
depositions of witnesses in a foreign country.
151 This point should be obvious. If this were not true, then classified
documents “about” another nation would either be disclosed or not depending on the
laws of the country discussed in the document.
152 In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009). The
court never clearly states whether it considers this factor to be neutral, in favor, or
against U.S. discovery. Id. For purposes of the calculations discussed in this article,
this factor was treated as if the court had skipped it.
153 In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374,
374-78 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
154 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
158 In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 378
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
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refused to conclude that factor three weighed against violating
foreign law. In other instances, courts have skipped over factor
three, discussing only the subjective factors, all of which, courts
conclude, favor violating foreign law.159 The fact that some
courts skip the one factor that weighs against violating foreign
law might also indicate pro-forum bias.160
In sum, the Aérospatiale five-factor test’s sole objective
factor—whether the information sought originated in the
United States—weighs against violating foreign law in 94% of
cases applying the test. The enormous divergence in results for
the objective factor and the four subjective factors strongly
implies pro-forum bias. Another indication of pro-forum bias is
the fact that in some instances, courts have either skipped any
discussion of the objective factor or else employed twisted
reasoning to reach a desired result: that this factor is somehow
either neutral or favors violating foreign law despite the
information’s foreign origins.
D.

Factor Four: Alternative Means

Factor four of the Aérospatiale test asks courts to consider
“the availability of alternative means of securing the
information.”161 At first glance, this would appear to be an objective
factor. In fact, considering that many countries are signatories to
the Hague Convention and thus have an “alternative means of
securing the information,” this factor should almost always weigh
against violating foreign law. Many U.S. trial courts, however,
have reinterpreted factor four to call for an evaluation of the
merits of the alternative means of obtaining the information.162
These courts thus convert factor four into a subjective factor
159 Old Ladder Litig. Co., LLC v. Investcorp Bank, B.S.C., No. 08-Civ-0876,
2008 WL 2224292 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008); Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50
(M.D.N.C. 1991).
160 Even when courts acknowledge that factor three weighs against violating
foreign law, they often do so grudgingly. For example, one court acknowledged that
“the vast majority of the discovery sought here . . . originated outside of the United
States.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). This court
stated, however, that factor three is the “only one of the factors that arguably favors
recognition of the bank secrecy laws.” Id. (emphasis added). Why does the court use the
qualifier “arguably” here? This is an objective factor, and there is nothing “arguable”
about the fact that it weighs against the violation of foreign law.
161 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
162 See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text; see also Megan C. Chang
& Terry E. Chang, Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and
Anxieties Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases, 7 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 425, 435 (2013) (commenting that one judge “seemed to read a
likelihood of success qualification into factor four—that the ‘availability of alternative
means’ needed to be alternative means that were actually . . . likely to succeed”).
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rather than the objective factor it was apparently intended to
be.163 Not surprisingly, U.S. courts consistently find that simply
ordering the violation of foreign law is the preferable means of
obtaining information.164 Accordingly, courts often conclude that
factor four weighs in favor of violating foreign law despite such
alternative options as a Hague Convention request, third-party
subpoenas, or commencing a legal action in the foreign nation.
In one 2012 case, a plaintiff demanded that a not-for-profit
European entity that sets standards for mobile telecommunications
produce documents (in violation of French law) for the arguably
weak purpose of determining whether or not a U.S. court had
jurisdiction over the European entity in the first place.165 The
court decided that factor four (“the availability of alternative
means of securing the information”) weighed in favor of violating
French law, notwithstanding the availability of using a Hague
Convention request to obtain the documents. The court reached
this counterintuitive result because it unilaterally declared that
“the procedures . . . [of] the Hague Evidence Convention are much
more likely to be time-consuming.”166
In another case, the court rejected a bank’s suggestion
that plaintiffs lawfully seek the turnover of documents by filing
actions in the foreign jurisdictions. The court rejected this option
because it “would require hiring local counsel” and might lead to
“significant costs and logistical concerns . . . with no clear
likelihood of success.”167 Concluding that the information would
not be “easily obtained,” the court stated that “[t]his factor
therefore supports disclosure.”168 In both this example and in
TruePosition (the 2012 case involving a not-for-profit European
entity that set standards for mobile telecommunications), the
courts rejected alternative means of obtaining information

163 Factor four appears to be an objective factor because it merely refers to
whether or not “alternative means of securing the information” are available, which is
an objective fact (either alternative means are available or they are not). The language
of factor four (“the availability of alternative means of securing the information”) gives
no indication that a court is expected to subjectively weigh the various means of
obtaining the information. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
164 See infra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
165 The purpose is weak because the discovery would be about the meta-issue
of whether or not the U.S. court has jurisdiction, as opposed to discovery relevant to the
merits of the litigation. Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012
WL 707012, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012).
166 Id. at *15.
167 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05
Civ. 2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG), 07 Civ.
6563(TPG), 08 Civ. 2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ.6978(TPG), 09 Civ.
1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013).
168 Id.
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because the options were not as fast and easy as the court simply
ordering the violation of foreign law.
Speed and simplicity are common—though flawed—
justifications for finding that alternative means are unsatisfactory.
One court acknowledged that “alternative means are available”
but declared that the Hague Convention was an unsatisfactory
solution because it was a voluntary mechanism between foreign
sovereigns.169 As such, the court felt that the Hague Convention
would be “highly unlikely” to provide the requesting party with “a
response similar” to what the party would receive if the court
simply ordered the violation of foreign law.170
As demonstrated in these examples, courts often assert
that the “alternative means” must be “similar” in speed, cost, and
effectiveness to a U.S. court ordering the production of documents.
There are at least two logical flaws with this assertion. First, as
discussed above, the Aérospatiale test only asks whether
alternative means exist. There is no indication that these
alternative means must be evaluated and dismissed if they are
more “time consuming.” Second, it is unclear what alternative
could ever be considered “equal” to a court order in terms of speed,
cost, and effectiveness from the perspective of the requesting
party. After all, a court order requiring production of documents
in violation of foreign law is immediate and requires no additional
expense or effort by the requesting party.
Overall, 85% (46 out of 54) of cases to apply the Aérospatiale
five-factor test have found factor four to favor violating foreign law.
As noted above, factor four was apparently intended to be an
objective factor, merely asking about the “availability” of
alternative means of obtaining the information. Considering that
the Hague Convention and other options are usually available,
the problem is not that the results are lopsided, but rather that
the lopsided results go in the wrong direction in favor of ordering
the violation of foreign law.
Some decisions rejecting the Hague Convention as an
“alternative means” display a marked disrespect for international
comity. One U.S. bankruptcy court stated that the Hague
Convention
was
unsatisfactory
because
it
is
“not
compulsory[,] . . . can take upwards of six weeks to begin the
process, and involve[s] the oversight of the French government.”171
The bankruptcy court contrasted this with the fact that “[a]n order
169 Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., C10-227, 2011 WL 6330064, at
*4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011).
170 Id.
171 In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp., Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009).
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of this Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be
enforced immediately,” and the bankruptcy court could
“maintain[ ] direct supervisory authority over discovery.”172
According to the bankruptcy court’s reasoning, a delay of six
weeks justified ordering a nonparty to break French law. Even
more disturbing is the bankruptcy court’s assertion that the
Hague Convention was unsatisfactory because it would put the
French government in charge of gathering evidence in France.
The court preferred to order the violation of foreign law so that
the bankruptcy court could maintain “supervisory authority over
discovery.”173 The bankruptcy court took for granted that it—not
France—should act as the “supervisory authority” in France
regarding collection of French evidence.
The Aérospatiale dissent seemed to fear just this sort of
scenario. It warned that “[o]ne of the ways that a pro-forum bias
has manifested itself is in United States courts’ preoccupation
with their own power to issue discovery orders.”174 In Global
Power, the bankruptcy court not only wanted to maintain
“supervisory authority” over French discovery, but it rejected the
Hague Convention process precisely to avoid letting France have
authority over French discovery.175 This dismissal of the Hague
Convention is especially disconcerting considering that the United
States proposed the Hague Convention in order to create a
discovery process “that would be ‘tolerable’ to the State executing
the request.”176 As one commentator stated, “[t]he best evidence of
what would be tolerable to the various parties is the mechanisms
which they agreed to in the Convention.”177 In effect, the
bankruptcy court rejected the Hague Convention precisely
because the Hague Convention respects international comity.178
Both the bankruptcy court and other U.S. courts cite the
purportedly slow speed of the Hague Convention as a justification

Id.
Id.
174 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 553 n.4 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
175 In re Global Power Equip. Grp., 418 B.R. at 848.
176 Roger C. Wilson, The Hague Evidence Convention in U.S. Courts: Aérospatiale
and the Path Not Taken, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 591, 602
(1987); see Philip W. Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 105 (1973); Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530
(stating that the Hague Convention’s purpose was to establish a “system for obtaining
evidence located abroad that would be ‘tolerable’ to the State executing the request and
would produce evidence ‘utilizable’ in the requesting state”).
177 See Wilson, supra note 176, at 602.
178 In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp., 418 B.R. at 848.
172
173
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for rejecting its use.179 This justification seems unfair and perhaps
disingenuous. For instance, although the bankruptcy court
complained that the Hague Convention process may “take upwards
of six weeks to begin the process,” in Aérospatiale itself, 15 months
passed just between the Eighth Circuit’s ruling and the Supreme
Court’s final decision—a decision that was limited to the metaissue of whether or not the Hague Convention’s procedures were
required.180 Moreover, Aérospatiale’s underlying claim arose in
1980, meaning that seven years had passed between the
underlying incident and the decision as to whether the Hague
Convention would be used to collect evidence.181 As Justice
Blackmun stated in dissent, “[c]ertainly discovery controlled by
litigants under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not known
for placing a high premium on either speed or cost-effectiveness.”182
Given that the United States expects other nations to proceed
through the Hague Convention when seeking evidence from the
United States, it is hypocritical for the United States to reject the
procedure it pushed to have established.183
Not only do courts often reject the use of alternative
methods of obtaining evidence from overseas, they also tend to
absolve requesting litigants from having to make any effort to
avoid violating laws when obtaining information. In one case, the
plaintiffs sought a court order to violate foreign law even though
the plaintiffs had made no effort to obtain the information
legally.184 The defendant complained that the plaintiffs never
“formally or informally request[ed] any information from the
Taiwanese government or the [relevant agency].”185 The court,
179 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Li, No. 10-Civ-4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (rejecting it as “time-consuming”); In re Glob. Power Equip.
Grp., 418 B.R. at 833 (rejecting the Convention because it can “take upwards of six
weeks to begin the process”).
180 The Eighth Circuit ruled on January 22, 1986. See In re Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (1986). The Supreme Court did not rule on the
appeal until June 15, 1987, nearly 15 months later. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 522.
181 In re Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d at 122.
182 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
183 U.S. complaints that other nations are too slow to execute requests are
hypocritical considering that the United States will take as long as two years to execute a
request. Morris H. Deutsch, Judicial Assistance: Obtaining Evidence in the United States,
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, for Use in a Foreign or International Tribunal, 5 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 175, 176 n.7 (1982); see also Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on
Private Int’l Law, Questionnaire of May 2008 Relating to the Hague Convention of 18
March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, at 12, Prel. Doc. No. 1 (2008),
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008usa20.pdf [http://perma.cc/NL5A-FH9D] (last visited
Dec. 14, 2015).
184 In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 378
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
185 Id.
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however, concluded that plaintiffs did not need to attempt to
obtain the information legally and found that this factor weighed
in favor of violating foreign law because the plaintiffs did not need
to proceed through any alternative means to get the information.186
The court wrote, “[n]or must plaintiffs request information from
Taiwan before seeking discovery from the defendant . . . .
Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs.”187 Absolving a
litigant of making any effort to avoid violating foreign law is
already problematic. Declaring that this factor weighs in favor of
violating foreign law because the litigant need not take any steps
to avoid violating foreign law is particularly extreme.
In fact, a number of courts have asserted that factor
four (alternative means) favors violating foreign law because
litigants have the right to choose which method they wish to
use to obtain information.188 Under this strange analysis, it is
irrelevant whether or not alternative means of obtaining the
information exist. If a party wishes to order the violation of
foreign law, these courts assert, that is the party’s prerogative.
For example, a bank seeking to avoid violating foreign law
“urged” the requesting party to “please go down to Ecuador. Use
the letters rogatory process, which is available to you, and get an
order from a court in Ecuador . . . . We will not object.”189 There,
the bank identified an “alternative means” of obtaining the
information (letters rogatory) and even showed that the process
would likely be successful. Yet the U.S. court, purportedly
applying the fourth factor of the Aérospatiale test (“the
availability of alternative means of securing the information”190),
expressed irritation that the bank identified alternative means of
securing information:
Here, it appears that the bank wants to pick and [choose] the method
and mechanism by which [the requesting party] obtains discovery. [The
requesting party] may, of course, avail itself of the Letters Rogatory
mechanism. However, the decision to do so [lies] exclusively with [the
requesting party], not with [the bank]. The Court finds no authority that

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
188 See supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text. These courts never
explain why a litigant would prefer obtaining information through a method that
violates foreign law as opposed to a method that does not.
189 In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at
*13 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012).
190 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987).
186
187
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would require [the requesting party] to initiate the Letters Rogatory
process . . . .191

By presupposing that the litigant has the right to select the
means by which to obtain the information, the court has turned
the Aérospatiale test into a nullity. The test’s purpose is to
determine whether foreign law should be violated, yet this
court presupposed that a litigant gets to make that decision.
The court also took the position that an entity potentially being
ordered to violate foreign law has no right to propose
alternative mechanisms of obtaining the information. This sort
of reasoning encourages abusive discovery practices. Litigants
will demand the violation of foreign laws, secure in the
knowledge that courts will enforce these demands regardless of
whether alternative methods exist.
E.

Factor Five: Balancing National Interests

Factor five requires courts to weigh “the extent to which
noncompliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the
information is located.”192 In other words, courts weigh the
relative national interests of the United States and the foreign
government. It is perhaps unsurprising then that U.S. courts
overwhelmingly find that U.S. interests trump foreign state
interests, even in questionable situations. U.S. courts have
found the United States interest to outweigh the foreign interest
in 81% of cases (42 out of 52).
U.S. courts fall into pro-forum bias when weighing
national interests in part because those courts often do not even
understand the foreign interests at stake. U.S. courts tend to
underestimate the importance of financial privacy while
overestimating the importance of their own work in overseeing
litigation. Perversely, U.S. courts sometimes refuse to take
foreign laws seriously unless those nations punish or imprison
individuals for obeying U.S. court orders. And U.S. courts will
even claim to know better than the foreign government what that
nation’s interest is.

191 Chevron, 2012 WL 3636925, at *13; In re Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 122 (1986).
192 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
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1. U.S. Courts Struggle to Understand Foreign
Interests
The Aérospatiale dissent feared that pro-forum bias and
unfamiliarity with foreign societies would cause U.S. trial courts
to undervalue and overlook the foreign interests implicated in
these disputes.193 At the same time, U.S. trial courts will naturally
overvalue the importance of U.S. discovery. Litigation and
discovery, after all, is what U.S. trial courts do on a daily basis.
U.S. trial courts cannot objectively weigh the importance of U.S.
litigation and discovery against the importance of foreign law.194 It
is not reasonable to expect U.S. courts to fairly and impartially
evaluate these interests. And as the Aérospatiale dissent noted,
U.S. courts are particularly unfamiliar with the interests behind
the foreign laws they are attempting to evaluate.195
In fact, many U.S. courts attempting to apply the
Aérospatiale test have confessed their unfamiliarity with the
foreign laws they are supposedly weighing. One court noted that
“Mexico apparently has an interest in restricting access to
information about the ‘operations’ of its holding companies[, but
t]he level of that interest is difficult to gauge.”196 Another court
acknowledged that many “foreign states have an interest in
protecting privacy rights which is recognized as substantial,” and
“[m]any countries’ laws contain significant penalties for
violation[s] of the privacy laws—for example, in Uruguay
violators face [a] potential prison sentence.”197 Nevertheless, the
court was “not clear [ ] in this particular case [whether] the
foreign countries’ interests are significant.”198 Yet another U.S.
court expressed doubt as to whether the German constitutional
principle of proportionality (protecting personal and business
privacy) constituted “significant sovereign interests.”199 As one
commentator sarcastically stated, “a principle which a State has
chosen to enumerate in its constitution would generally appear to
indicate a significant sovereign interest in the matter at issue.”200
Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Sant, supra note 1.
195 Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
196 British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90Civ.2370,
2000 WL 713057, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000).
197 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05 Civ.
2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG), 07 Civ. 6563(TPG),
08 Civ. 2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ.6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ.
1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013).
198 Id.
199 Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 54 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
200 Chalmers, supra note 33, at 206.
193

194
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Likewise, in two other cases, courts stated that “it is unclear
whether any Italian interests would actually be undermined” (in
reference to documents allegedly protected from disclosure by the
Italian Personal Data Code)201 and expressed uncertainty as to
“any interest Sweden may maintain in protecting trade secrets,”202
respectively. Another court noted that “the PRC’s State Secrecy
Bureau has directly expressed an interest in the outcome of this
case” but added that the “strength [of that interest] is unknown.”203
In each of these cases, the courts are explicit that they do
not understand either the foreign interests or the strength of
those interests. Yet despite these courts’ acknowledged lack of
understanding, each of them still ordered the documents at issue
to be produced in violation of foreign law. And trial courts are not
alone in struggling to understand foreign interests. Even the
Supreme Court has stated that it has “little competence in
determining precisely when foreign nations will be offended by
particular acts.”204
Supporting the view that U.S. courts are poorly equipped
to balance U.S. and foreign interests is the fact that three cases in
a 10-month period reached wildly divergent results as to whether
or not U.S. or Chinese interests were greater, despite nearly
identical underlying facts. All three cases dealt with plaintiffs
demanding information from Chinese banks, in pursuit of money
judgments against copyright infringers who held accounts at the
banks.205 As pointed out by commentators, “each of the cases was
decided in the Second Circuit and shared nearly identical facts,”206
and yet “the comity analysis . . . led to inconsistent outcomes
despite similar circumstances and, in some instances, identical
evidence.”207 Inconsistent outcomes based on the same facts
demonstrate that the Aérospatiale test is amorphous, overly
subjective, and prone to subconscious biases.

201 Devon Robotics v. DeViedma, No. 09-cv-3552, 2010 WL 3985877, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2010).
202 AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08-1512(RMB/AMD), 2011 WL
1421800, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011).
203 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1476-77
(9th Cir. 1992).
204 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983); see
also SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 336-37 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(stating that courts “generally are not the proper bodies to weigh which sovereign’s
interests are more meritorious”).
205 Chang & Chang, supra note 162, at 425.
206 Id.
207 West, supra note 60, at 190-91.
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More than one U.S. court has ordered the violation of a
foreign nation’s constitutionally enshrined rights.208 In one
instance, the U.S. court ordered the violation of a foreign court
order barring certain lawyers from producing documents in
violation of the nation’s constitution and its implementation of
attorney-client privilege.209 The willingness of U.S. courts to
violate foreign constitutions and foreign court orders shows
remarkable dismissiveness towards foreign sovereigns and
undermines the rule of law internationally.
2. U.S. Courts Undervalue the Foreign Interest in
Financial Privacy
The most frequently implicated foreign interest in cases
applying the Aérospatiale test is bank secrecy and financial
privacy. One court recently noted that it is “frequent and
common” for “a foreign litigant, particularly a bank,” to be ordered
to produce documents in violation of foreign laws.210 Many of these
cases involve attempts by U.S. litigants to force banks to turn over
personal financial records held overseas. Nearly every foreign
nation has laws protecting financial privacy, which indicates how
important and accepted these laws are.211 Nevertheless, U.S. trial
courts routinely underestimate how strongly a foreign nation will
oppose “having its citizens’ private financial information vacuumed
up in discovery and passed around in a foreign country among
private litigants, law firms, document review teams, discovery
vendors, third-party translators, court personnel, assorted experts,
and others.”212 One commentator describes foreign nations as being
“offended by what they perceive as . . . callous intrusions on their
sovereignty.”213 Even the ABA has commented upon the trend of
courts ordering the violation of foreign financial privacy and bank
secrecy laws, stating that courts are overly focused on “any
applicable exceptions to the foreign law and any ability of a
208 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 296 F.R.D. 168, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(Ecuadorian constitutional right); Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 54 (M.D.N.C. 1991)
(German constitutional right).
209 Chevron, 296 F.R.D. at 201-02.
210 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 18, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal
Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
211 See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 03 Civ.
8845(TPG), 05 Civ. 2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG),
07 Civ. 6563(TPG), 08 Civ. 2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ.6978(TPG), 09 Civ.
1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (identifying
numerous nations with financial privacy laws); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d
310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
212 See Sant, supra note 1, at 2.
213 Swanson, supra note 65, at 333.
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banking customer to waive secrecy” to justify compelling broad
violations of foreign law.214
Banks are often caught between U.S. discovery requests
and foreign laws protecting financial privacy and bank secrecy.
Even the Restatement of Foreign Law is uncertain as to banks’
obligations in a conflict of laws scenario, noting that “[w]hether
and to what extent” banks must take action “to avoid sanctions in
the United States is not clear.”215 The Restatement adds that
“United States courts have disagreed on the obligations of nonparty custodians, such as banks and brokers, with offices in the
United States and foreign states.”216 Considering the frequency of
these conflicts between U.S. discovery and foreign financial
privacy laws, it is troubling that there is so little clarity on the
expectations for international banks and so little recognition in
U.S. courts of the value and importance of financial privacy laws.
Many U.S. courts weighing the foreign interest in financial
privacy laws overlook the fact that these banks are often
nonparties that are not accused of any wrongdoing. Commentators
have found it remarkable that courts require a bank “not actually
a party to the litigation” to violate the law.217 Commentators note
that judges “seemed to project some culpability on the [nonparty]
214 HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, RESOLUTION 103, at 14 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolu
tions/2012_hod_midyear_meeting_103.doc [http://perma.cc/UC9A-GQQ6].
215 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 442(2)(c), 442 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
216 Id. § 442, cmt. h (1987). In the years prior to Aérospatiale, courts took
contradictory positions regarding banks trapped between U.S. discovery demands and
foreign financial privacy and bank secrecy laws. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal
of one lawsuit when the plaintiff failed to produce records kept in a Swiss bank, declaring
that “petitioner’s failure to satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due to
inability” as a result of circumstances outside its control. “It is hardly debatable that fear of
criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not
weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.” Société
Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 211 (1958). A Second Circuit decision stated that “fundamental principles of
international comity” required that the courts send letters rogatory rather than simply
order the violation of Canadian law. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960). The
Seventh Circuit refused to enforce an IRS summons for the production of banking records
from Athens that would have violated Greek financial privacy laws. United States v. First
Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). One year after Aérospatiale, the D.C.
Circuit likewise agreed that a bank was not required to disclose records covered by foreign
bank secrecy laws. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On the other
hand, at least in the context of criminal grand jury proceedings, the Fifth Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit both required the production of financial records in violation of the bank
secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404,
410 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119, 1385-86 (1983). Considering the
massive increase in demands for banks to produce documents in violation of foreign law, the
severe and enduring split by U.S. circuit courts as to the obligations of international banks
requires more guidance from the Supreme Court.
217 Chang & Chang, supra note 162, at 435-36.
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bank—as if it were partly to blame for the [defendants’
actions].”218 The willingness of courts to order nonparties to
violate the law in a home jurisdiction is striking considering that
“the non-party status” of an entity has been described as the
“principal argument . . . against allowing discovery” via court
order.219 Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Aérospatiale, many
lower courts specifically distinguished between how nonparties and
parties to a litigation should be treated; courts generally recognized
that nonparty entities have an especially strong claim to protection
from court-ordered law breaking.220 In fact, the intermediate
appellate court in Aérospatiale specifically distinguished between
how parties and nonparties should be treated. In recent years, by
contrast, courts have often ignored a bank’s nonparty status.
Aérospatiale emphasized that substantive rules of law
(such as bank secrecy and financial privacy laws) are to be given
greater deference by courts than blocking statutes.221 Moreover,
just as substantive laws require greater deference, “intrusive”
discovery requests should be viewed with greater caution.222
Aérospatiale noted that “[s]ome discovery procedures are much
more ‘intrusive’ than others.”223 As examples of less intrusive
discovery, the majority cited an interrogatory seeking the names
of pilots and a request for an admission that the defendant
advertised in a certain magazine.224 The court’s example of a more
intrusive discovery request was a production demand for “design
specifications, line drawings, and engineering plans.”225 Yet both
the “less intrusive” and “much more intrusive” examples of
discovery given by the majority pale in comparison to forcing banks
to hand over people’s private financial records. Considering that
financial privacy is a “substantive rule of law”226 that involves

Id. at 439.
Borchers, supra note 32, at 82.
220 Swanson, supra note 65, at 346-51. Prior to the Aérospatiale ruling, many of
the circuit courts (including the immediate appellate court) had distinguished between
parties and nonparties in regards to court-ordered violations of the law. Id. at 347. Under
this analysis, nonparties were protected by the Hague Evidence Convention while parties
were not under its protection. See id.
221 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544-45 (1987).
222 Id. at 545.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Mark Brodeur, Court Ordered Violation of Foreign Bank Secrecy and
Blocking Laws: Solving the Extraterritorial Dilemma, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 563, 565-66, 569
(1988); C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States’ Assault on Foreign
Bank Secrecy, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 454, 454-55 (1992); G. Philip Rutledge, Bank Secrecy
Laws: An American Perspective, 14 DICK. J. INT’L L. 601 (1996).
218
219
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some of the most intrusive discovery possible, courts should be far
more hesitant to order banks to violate financial privacy laws.
Among the highest-profile recent cases dealing with courtimposed law breaking is a series of lawsuits alleging that a
variety of large banks supported international terrorism by
permitting terrorists to misuse banking services.227 The allegations
in these cases are salacious and emotional, if not necessarily
backed by factual support. Many U.S. courts have found that the
purported U.S. interest in fighting terrorism requires production of
huge swaths of financial records in violation of the foreign state’s
financial privacy laws.228 Courts have been willing to find that
these charges trump financial privacy even though the supposed
“terrorism” interest is based on unproven allegations brought by a
private litigant and despite the plaintiffs’ demand for massive
swaths of private financial information.229 The implication is that
salacious allegations trump financial privacy.
Foreign nations’ strong interest in their financial privacy
laws is exemplified by a recent U.S. trial court decision ordering
production of financial records held by a bank’s branches in
multiple nations.230 Each of these foreign nations prohibited
production, and the U.S. court acknowledged that punishment for
violations involved “significant penalties,” including a potential
prison sentence.231 The fact that so many nations severely punish
the release of financial records demonstrates that financial
privacy is a strong national interest. Even so, the court concluded
that the U.S. “interest in fully and fairly adjudicating the matters
before its courts, including enforcing its judgments, outweighs the
foreign countries’ interest in protecting its banking customers’
records.”232 Similarly, a separate court asserted that “the United
States interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its
courts . . . outweighs Malaysia’s interest in protecting the

227 See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit
Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 534-35, 578-85 (2013). The targets
of these suits include banks that even most plaintiff lawyers would admit are unlikely to
actually support terrorism, such as National Westminster Bank, UBS, Credit Lyonnais,
Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Barclays, Bank of China, and American Express Bank.
228 See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 92-95, 105 (2d. Cir. 2013);
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 430, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Weiss v. Nat’l
Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
229 See, e.g., Linde, 706 F.3d at 92-95; Strauss 249 F.R.D. at 430, 456; Weiss,
242 F.R.D. at 33.
230 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 03 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05 Civ.
2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG), 07 Civ. 6563(TPG),
08 Civ. 2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ.6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ.
1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013).
231 Id. at *10.
232 Id. at *11.
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confidentiality of its banking customers’ records.”233 In both
instances, the U.S. courts found that merely initiating a lawsuit
in the United States caused the U.S. interest in discovery
procedures to outweigh foreign financial privacy laws.
These U.S. courts have subordinated foreign financial
privacy laws to the “United States interest in fully and fairly
adjudicating the matters before its courts.”234 This analysis is
“obviously problematic because any court undertaking the
Aérospatiale five-factor balancing test is necessarily doing so as
part of a litigation.”235 If the existence of U.S. litigation outweighs
the foreign nation’s interest in its own laws, then U.S. litigation
will always trump foreign laws, and there would be no need for an
Aérospatiale test.236
3. U.S. Courts Overvalue the U.S. Interest in
Overseeing Litigation
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the statement that
the United States has a “vital” interest “in vindicating the
rights of American plaintiffs and in enforcing the judgments of
its courts.”237 Many courts have repeated this language or
followed its logic, which has been described as the “United
States interest in fully and fairly adjudicating the matters
before its courts.”238 This oft-repeated language is problematic.
The Ninth Circuit’s choice of language—“vindicating the rights
of American plaintiffs”—carries a disturbingly jingoistic edge.
The court appears to be stating that the nationality of litigants
is relevant—that the United States has an interest in hearing
the dispute because the plaintiffs are American. In these cases,
the pro-forum bias of U.S. courts is explicit. A recent Florida
decision is even more overt (the defendant was a U.S. entity):
233 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL
808639, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
234 See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
235 See Sant, supra note 1 (emphasis added); see also Palazzolo, supra note 124.
236 If the Supreme Court in Aérospatiale had intended for courts to weigh the
purported U.S. interest in “vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs” or in “fully
and fairly adjudicating the matters before its courts,” it seems that the Supreme Court
would have said so. After all, this is an interest that would necessarily come up in each
and every case to apply the Aérospatiale factors.
237 Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th
Cir. 1992).
238 See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 92-95 (2d. Cir. 2013); Strauss
v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 430, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster
Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Coloplast A/S. v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc.,
No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL 6330064, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011) (quoting the
language in Richmark); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on October 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D.
374, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (partially quoting the language in Richmark).
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In these circumstances, the relevant interests tilt in favor of the
defendant’s interests as a defendant in a United States court because,
first, the United States undoubtedly has a substantial interest in fully
and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts, which is only possible
with complete discovery. And, second, this jurisdiction has an important
interest in protecting its own nationals from unfair disadvantage when
they are being sued . . . .239

According to the court, the “important interest” involved is
America’s interest in “protecting its own nationals.”240 The choice of
the phrase “its own nationals,” as opposed to a more generalized
phrase, such as “a litigant,” indicates that the court views its duties
as protecting American litigants. This is not merely pro-forum bias,
it is pro-U.S. litigant bias.
Equally stark language appears in a district court’s ruling
that, although Spain had a “strong national interest” in preserving
the confidentiality of a criminal investigation file, the file should
nevertheless be produced.241 The court asserted that the United
States’ interests were greater than Spain’s interests, describing the
U.S. interests as “America’s interests in the fair adjudication of a
billion dollar lawsuit brought against American defendants in an
American court.”242 The triple repetition of the word “America(n)”
within this single sentence demonstrates that the court might have
improperly focused on the nationality of the litigants.
The supposed U.S. interest in “adjudicating the matters
before its courts” is precisely the sort of thing U.S. courts would
likely overvalue. Courts evaluating the importance of their own
work will naturally have a cognitive bias. Nevertheless, many
courts cite to the national interest in adjudication in justifying a
finding that otherwise weak U.S. interests trump foreign law. For
example, one court stated that “the underlying interest—
collection of a judgment by a private party—is not so dramatic.”243
Nevertheless, despite the “not so dramatic” issue at stake, the
court decided that the mere existence of the litigation outweighed
the foreign nation’s interest in the integrity of its laws.244
Similarly, some U.S. courts use the purported U.S. interest
in “adjudicating matters” to transform weak U.S. interests into
supposedly “significant” interests. One example of this is
239 Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la Republica de Chile v. Espirito Santo
Bank, No. 09-20613-CIV., 2010 WL 2162868, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2010).
240 See id. at *2.
241 Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573LTS/RLE,
2006 WL 2239641, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006).
242 Id.
243 Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
244 Id. (asserting that “[U.S.] courts consistently recognize that the United
States has a substantial interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its
courts” (quoting Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 443) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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jurisdictional discovery (that is, discovery into a defendant’s
contacts with the United States to determine whether a U.S.
court may proceed with adjudicating the litigation). By its nature,
jurisdictional discovery is tangential to the underlying litigation.
Nevertheless, one court claimed that jurisdictional discovery
implicated the “interest in bringing these claims in a timely fashion
before an American court” and that therefore the U.S. “interest in
fully and fairly adjudicating such suits” constituted “significant
national interests of the United States.”245 Jurisdictional discovery,
which is not even about the merits of a litigation, but rather is a
complex, time-consuming analysis of whether or not a court has
jurisdiction over a case in the first place, is a particularly weak
“national interest.” Regarding jurisdictional discovery, one scholar
writes that she is “unaware of any other legal system that
undertakes this type of labor-intensive, adverse proceeding before
the jurisdiction of the court is even established.”246 Considering
that other nations do not even perform jurisdictional discovery,
the supposed U.S. interest in jurisdictional discovery would
seemingly be among the weakest possible “national interests.”
The fact that U.S. courts nevertheless do find that this interest
outweighs foreign laws indicates that U.S. courts are incapable of
impartially weighing U.S. and foreign interests.
4. U.S. Courts Demand Foreign Governments Punish
Those Who Obey U.S. Court Orders
In a particularly perverse twist, the same courts that
order foreign law breaking also demand that the foreign country
punish those obeying the U.S. court order. The American Bar
Association issued a resolution stating that any court order
requiring the choice between violating foreign law and violating a
U.S. court order “is inconsistent with promotion of rule of law, as
it facilitates violation of law, either abroad or here.”247 Foreign
governments, more respectful of this conflict than U.S. courts,
have usually not punished companies that obey a U.S. court order
and produce documents in violation of the law. Foreign regulators
apparently recognize that companies facing a no-win situation
should not be punished. Yet for U.S. courts, the failure to punish
245 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012).
246 S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 494 (2010).
247 HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, RESOLUTION 103, at 3 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolu
tions/2012_hod_midyear_meeting_103.doc [http://perma.cc/UC9A-GQQ6].
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entities obeying U.S. court orders proves that foreign governments
are not serious about their laws. In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,
for example, the court stated that it would order production of
documents in violation of the law in France, Jordan, and the
United Arab Emirates because it believed that these nations
traditionally had not punished those obeying U.S. court orders to
violate the nations’ laws.248 Discussing the financial privacy laws of
these nations, the judge asked: “But is this [concern with financial
privacy] for real? If a given country truly values its national policy
of, say, criminalizing compliance with a U.S. court subpoena, it will
prosecute its citizens for so complying.”249 Not only was this judge
ordering the violation of foreign law, he was stating that if these
nations want their laws to be respected in the future, they must
punish the entities that comply with the judge’s order.
Another court noted that officials at financial institutions
violating financial privacy laws could be punished by “one to five
years imprisonment” by the foreign nation, but the court still
ordered the laws to be violated because the laws “do not appear to
be enforced.”250 Decisions like these “place[ ] the banks in the
position of having to be sanctioned in order to prove they will be
sanctioned.”251 Further, and perversely, these U.S. court decisions
require the foreign state to actually punish companies obeying
U.S. court orders.
5. U.S. Courts Unilaterally Define Foreign States’
Interests
From the perspective of foreign states, perhaps the most
infuriating issue is that U.S. courts will often unilaterally decide
that the foreign states’ interests are something different from
what the foreign states assert. In other words, the courts not only
ignore or reject the foreign states’ interests, but they even claim to
know better than the foreign state what those interests are.252
This occurred in a high-profile antiterrorism litigation in which a
U.S. court ordered a bank to violate bank secrecy and financial
privacy laws in three foreign nations.253 The judge acknowledged
that “bank secrecy is an important interest of the foreign
jurisdictions” and even noted that “indeed the United States has
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 402.
250 In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at
*13 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2012).
251 See West, supra note 60, at 223.
252 As one British attorney sarcastically told me, “It’s quite nice of you
Americans to tell us what our interests are.”
253 Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
248

249
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enacted similar bank secrecy protections.”254 The judge also noted
that Jordan and Lebanon both ordered the international bank not
to violate their bank secrecy laws.255
Nevertheless, the judge proceeded to make the
extraordinary claim that Jordan and Lebanon had a different
national interest than the one that they claimed to have.256 The
magistrate judge seized upon Jordan’s and Lebanon’s publicly
stated commitments to fighting terrorism to claim that “[b]oth
Jordan and Lebanon[ ] have recognized the supremacy of
[combating terrorism and compensating its victims] over bank
secrecy.”257 Yet such a conclusion not only usurps Jordan’s and
Lebanon’s rights to determine their own national interests, it also
assumes that a private lawsuit is factually correct in its
allegations. Apparently, in the court’s mind, any time a private
litigant alleges a connection to terrorism, the seriousness of the
allegations trump financial privacy protections. This is a
particularly problematic position considering the recent flood of
complaints making questionable terrorism-related allegations
against banks.258
The bank, trapped between a U.S. court order and the
laws of Lebanon and its home nation of Jordan, eventually chose
to follow the orders of its home and regional regulators and not
produce broad swaths of financial records in violation of Jordan’s
laws. The U.S. court then imposed sanctions. The district court
acknowledged that “[v]iolations of these [bank secrecy] laws may
carry criminal penalties” but still required the violation of
financial privacy laws for tens of thousands of private bank
accounts belonging to individuals and businesses.259 On appeal,
the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he District Court’s explication of
the foreign states’ interests in enforcing the bank secrecy laws
were, perhaps, spare.”260 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit too
repeated the claim that “Jordan and Lebanon have expressed a
strong interest in deterring the financial support of terrorism,”
and “these interests have often outweighed the enforcement of
Id. at 315.
Id.; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan at 4-5, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 134 S. Ct. 2869 (2014) (No.
12-1485), 2013 WL 3830458, at *5 (noting in the introductory statement that the trial
court’s sanctions order “severely punishes [the bank] for adhering to Jordan’s financial
privacy laws during discovery” and stating that “Jordanian law barred Arab Bank from
disclosing many of those records”).
256 Linde, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
257 Id.
258 See Sant, supra note 227, at 534 (describing growth in number of lawsuits).
259 Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 193 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
260 Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 111 (2d Cir. 2013).
254
255

224

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

bank secrecy laws, even . . . in the foreign states.”261 Each of these
courts concluded that it knows better than foreign sovereigns
what the nations’ interests should be.262
Unsurprisingly, many governments have found it
presumptuous and offensive for trial courts to usurp the right to
decide the foreign governments’ national interests. As a result of
this “grave affront to its sovereignty,”263 the Kingdom of Jordan
filed its first-ever amicus brief in a court in the United States—the
U.S. Supreme Court.264 Moreover, the Prime Minister of Jordan
wrote to the U.S. Secretary of State to protest the district court’s
order.265 The United States, in an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court, sided with Jordan and criticized the lower courts for giving
“insufficient weight to the interests of foreign governments in
enforcing their own laws within their own territories.”266 The
United States also criticized the lower courts for misreading a
memorandum of understanding in which governments like Jordan
stated that antiterrorism efforts take precedence over bank secrecy.
According to the United States amicus brief, “that memorandum
of understanding pertains only to official state-to-state requests
for mutual legal assistance. It does not suggest that member
states have agreed to subordinate their interest in protecting
certain banking information from public disclosure when private
litigants seek documents.”267 Strikingly, the U.S. amicus brief
agreed with Jordan and Lebanon’s expressions of their national
interests, which means that the United States, Jordan, and
Lebanon all agreed that their national interest was in favor of
protecting financial privacy—but the U.S. trial and appellate
courts unilaterally declared their interests to be something else.
The Aérospatiale balancing test requires “in every
case[,] . . . a complex and problematic balancing of United States
Id.
U.S. courts seem to find it inconceivable that a nation could place financial
privacy rights above allegations from private litigants regarding terrorism. Yet the United
States also places certain forms of privacy above the fight against terrorism. For example,
the United States will not breach the privilege between a suspected terrorist and his
attorney. Likewise, U.S. courts will throw out evidence proving an individual was involved
in terrorism if the evidence was obtained without a warrant. Considering these and other
examples where privacy rights trump national antiterrorism efforts, it should not be
surprising that foreign sovereigns believe the financial privacy of hundreds or thousands
outweighs unsupported terrorism-related allegations made by a private litigant.
263 Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of Amicus Curiae the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan at 2, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 134 S. Ct. 2869 (2014) (No. 121485), 2013 WL 3830458, at *1.
264 Id. at *1.
265 Id. at *5.
266 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde at
16, No. 12-Civ-1485, 2013 WL 3830458, at *16 (U.S. July 24, 2013).
267 Id. at 17-18.
261
262
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and foreign sovereign interests.”268 Yet as this section has
demonstrated, and as commentators agree, “courts are a
particularly inappropriate forum, both practically and
constitutionally, for the amorphous political analysis necessary in
such a balancing.”269 Courts continue to show a pro-forum bias in
favor of U.S. national interests, and they frequently do not
understand the interests behind foreign nations’ laws. Moreover,
courts underestimate the importance of financial privacy laws.
U.S. courts allow mere allegations to trump financial privacy,
ignoring the fact that financial privacy laws are substantive and
that financial discovery is highly intrusive. Further, U.S. courts
reveal a cognitive bias in favor of discovery by overstating the
U.S. interest in adjudicating disputes in its courts. Perversely,
U.S. courts often refuse to take foreign laws seriously unless
foreign governments punish companies and banks for complying
with U.S. court orders to violate those laws. U.S. courts also
usurp the role of foreign governments in identifying the national
interests of foreign sovereigns. The extreme pro-forum bias of
U.S. trial courts has had serious negative repercussions for
nations, courts, companies, and individuals.
IV.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF AÉROSPATIALE AND PRO-FORUM
BIAS

The willingness of courts to order violations of foreign law
has caused a snowball effect of increasing requests for these
orders. There has been exponential growth in requests for courts
to order law breaking abroad, and many of these requests appear
to be improper. Specifically, litigants seek these court orders in
part to put pressure on an opposing litigant to enter into an
unwarranted settlement (so as to avoid having to either violate
foreign laws or a U.S. court order). This abusive discovery may
have caused foreign nations to retaliate by ordering production of
confidential U.S. documents.
A.

Exponential Growth in Demand for Court-Ordered Law
Breaking

The number of litigants seeking court-ordered violations of
foreign law has increased exponentially. In the first 10 years after
Aérospatiale, only two cases applied the five-factor Aérospatiale
268 See Wilson, supra note 176, at 603 (citing, inter alia, Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
269 Id.
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test to decide whether or not to order foreign law breaking.270 In
the most recent decade, by contrast, there are 50 such cases. In
fact, 60% of all cases applying Aérospatiale to the issue of foreign
law breaking have occurred in just the last five years.
This enormous—and indeed, exponential—increase is
represented in the chart below. The y-axis represents the total
number of cases applying Aérospatiale’s five-factor test to
determine whether or not to order foreign law breaking. The xaxis represents the number of years since the Aérospatiale
decision, from 1987 to 2014. For purposes of comparison, a
perfectly exponential rate of growth is overlaid on the chart. If the
current exponential growth continues, the number of cases would
surpass 200 by 2021.
Chart I: Exponential Growth in Requests for Courts to
Order Foreign Law Breaking
Vertical Axis Represents Number of Cases; Horizontal Axis
Represents Number of Years Post-Aérospatiale

Number of cases / years after
Aérospatiale decision (grey)
compared to exponential growth
(black)
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270 As previously noted, this article is limited to cases that apply the five-factor
Aérospatiale test and reveal the court’s analysis of most of the five factors. The numbers
discussed here do not include cases that applied the three-factor or four-factor Aérospatiale
tests. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applying the four-factor test). The point here is not the absolute number of cases but rather
the exponential growth in the number of these cases over time.
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To be sure, the current exponential rate of increase cannot
continue indefinitely, if for no other reason than that there is a
natural upper boundary in terms of the number of cases that
involve international discovery and potentially implicate foreign
laws. Nevertheless, the exponential rate of growth in these cases
is not explainable as the result of steady growth in international
litigation. Rather, the exponential growth appears to result from
a calculated change in litigation strategy. As litigants have come
to realize that courts overwhelmingly approve these requests,
litigants increasingly ask for documents that cannot be produced.
The producing party must either break the law of its home
jurisdiction or violate a U.S. court order—or perhaps enter into an
unwarranted settlement.
B.

Court-Ordered Law Breaking as Abusive Discovery

Two generations ago, it was held that a company doing
business in the United States and abroad should have
“protection from being caught between the jaws of [a U.S.]
judgment and the operation of laws in foreign countries where
it does its business.”271 Unfortunately, this protection has
evaporated. As shown below, litigants are increasingly
misusing court-ordered law breaking as a litigation strategy. A
company trapped between the choices of violating foreign law
or violating a U.S. court order will sometimes agree to pay an
unwarranted settlement.
A recent case involving United Overseas Bank provides a
concrete example of this problem of seemingly abusive discovery
and unwarranted settlement.272 The plaintiff obtained a default
judgment against alleged trademark infringers.273 These
infringers never responded to the charges or paid any damages.274
United Overseas Bank, a nonparty, was not accused of any
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, as part of the discovery into the
infringers’ financial information, the plaintiff sought a U.S. court
order that would require United Overseas Bank’s Malaysian
subsidiary to turn over those financial records.275 The subsidiary,
unable to gain permission from its Malaysian regulator, informed
the court of the conflict with Malaysian law. (Malaysian law
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953).
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL
808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
273 Memorandum & Order at 2, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09
Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2010).
274 Id.
275 Id.
271

272
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punished the release of private financial records with up to three
years in prison and a fine equal to $900,000 USD.276)
Nevertheless, applying the Aérospatiale five-factor analysis, the
magistrate judge ruled that the bank had to produce the records
within two weeks.277 The Malaysian regulator reaffirmed its
refusal to permit United Overseas Bank’s subsidiary to produce
the records.278 The bank was now trapped between conflicting
legal obligations, and the U.S. court began contempt proceedings.
In briefs to the U.S. court, United Overseas Bank asserted
that it was “in a no-win situation whereby it either faces criminal
punishment or civil penalties and fines in Malaysia, (personal to
officers and directors) or the corporation faces fines and sanction
in the United States.”279 The bank stated that it “has expended an
exorbitant amount of time and money” in an attempt to win
approval from Malaysian regulators to produce the information.280
The bank even offered the plaintiff law firm a creative solution,
stating that United Overseas Bank could enter “into a
confidentiality order with Plaintiff . . . to commence a proceeding
in Malaysia” against [the] defendants.”281 The bank would not
contest these hearings, and “if the application is not opposed, the
order will likely be obtained within 2 to 3 months.”282 The plaintiff
law firm rejected the offer.283
The court sanctioned United Overseas Bank for failing to
produce financial records in violation of Malaysian law.284 On May
27, 2010, the U.S. court held the bank in contempt, imposing a
$10,000 per day coercive fine for noncompliance.285 One month
later, the bank—a nonparty not accused of wrongdoing—settled
with the plaintiff for $250,000.286 The settlement did not provide
the plaintiff with any financial records about the actual
defendants.287 The plaintiff law firm later released a webcast
276 Gucci Am., 2010 WL 808639, at *4, *6; see also Letter to Honorable
Theodore H. Katz at 1, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)
(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (No. 23).
277 Gucci Am., 2010 WL 808639, at *8.
278 Memorandum of Law of Nonparty United Overseas Bank Limited in
Opposition to Request for Contempt at 7, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09
Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2010) (No. 27).
279 Id. at 2.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 12.
282 Id. at 9. The hearing was likely to be unopposed because the actual
defendants were in default and had not appeared at any hearings.
283 Id. at 14.
284 Order, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS) (THK),
2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010).
285 Id.
286 Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 4-7, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion,
No. 09 Civ. 8458 (RJS), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010) (No. 32).
287 Id. at 4-5.
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trumpeting their success in getting money from a third-party
bank.288 United Overseas Bank was only one of multiple thirdparty banks featured as having been forced to pay damages in
this way.289
The United Overseas Bank case and others like it
demonstrate that ordering entities to violate foreign law can trap
them between conflicting legal demands and lead to unwarranted
settlements. Mystifyingly, the Supreme Court in Aérospatiale
appears to have overlooked this negative consequence of courtordered law breaking. The Supreme Court did recognize that
abusive discovery demands could impose an “additional cost” and
that this financial cost “may increase the danger that discovery
may be sought for the improper purpose of motivating settlement,
rather than finding relevant and probative evidence.”290 While the
Supreme Court recognized the problem of cost, it seems to have
overlooked the danger of contempt charges against a
noncompliant nonparty.
Moreover, even in terms of cost, the Supreme Court
appears to have massively underestimated the costs imposed in
U.S. discovery. The Aérospatiale majority thinks that a party
might enter into an unwarranted settlement to avoid the “cost of
transportation of documents or witnesses to or from foreign
locations.”291 Yet transportation and witness costs are dwarfed by
the multimillion dollar expenses routinely incurred when running
electronic discovery (especially in a country that does not have an
e-discovery infrastructure).292 Electronic discovery frequently
requires massive battalions of U.S.-trained attorneys fluent in the
local language to scan through endless emails and documents
while coding for privilege and relevance.293 Thus, the Aérospatiale
majority both greatly underestimated the cost of abusive
288 Webcast: New Trends in Anti-Counterfeiting Litigation, GIBSON DUNN
(Nov. 25, 2010) http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Webcast-NewTrendsin
Anti-CounterfeitingLitigation.aspx [http://perma.cc/HLB4-YMZK]. The United Overseas
Bank case is featured in one of multiple slides entitled “Failing to Comply with Court’s
Orders Can Result in Serious Consequences for Third Parties.”
289 Failing to Comply with Court’s Orders Can Result in Serious Consequences for
Third Parties—United Overseas Bank (UOB), GIBSON DUNN, http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/WebcastSlides-NewTrendsInAnti-CounterfeitingLitigation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GA2M-MNAU] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
290 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
291 Id.
292 David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 151 (2011). Degnan summarizes the special requirements and
massive costs involved in sending attorneys overseas to conduct electronic discovery.
Id. at 183-84. In particular, the author notes that counsel must overcome culture,
language, and other communication issues. Id. at 184.
293 See id.
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discovery and overlooked the real danger of conflicting legal
obligations forcing entities into unwarranted settlements.
C.

Bias Against Non-Western Nations

Abusive discovery, unwarranted settlements, and proforum bias are bad enough. Some commentators have made a
further allegation of “unfairness” and bigotry in the way U.S.
courts treat the laws of different nations.294 According to these
commentators, U.S. courts are not only biased in favor of the
United States, they also show bias in favor of Western nations
and against non-Western nations.295 These commentators claim to
discern differences in how courts evaluate cases with similar
factual backgrounds but involve defendants from a Western
foreign nation (such as Switzerland) and a non-Western foreign
nation (such as China).296 One commentator called it “particularly
problematic” that courts seemed to be “unduly influenced by
attitudes” towards specific foreign countries.297 Others stated that
it is “interesting” that such “disparate holdings resulted from the
same five-factor comity analysis,”298 where the primary difference
was the nationality of the laws being analyzed.
To analyze whether courts have demonstrated a bias
against the laws of non-Western nations, I divided nations into
the West (including Canada, Europe, and Israel) and the nonWest (all others). At this point in time, the results discussed
below are merely suggestive; there are not yet enough cases to
find statistical significance. Nevertheless, results so far seem to
confirm the anecdotal sense of “unfairness” expressed by
commentators. To be sure, U.S. courts rarely find the Aérospatiale
test’s subjective factors to weigh in favor of respecting any foreign
nation’s laws. But when they do, courts were much more likely to
respect the laws of a Western nation than a non-Western nation.
When dealing with Western nations, courts found the
first factor (importance) weighed in favor of respecting foreign
law 12.5% of the time (4 cases out of 32). With non-Western
nations, the percentage was 8% (2 out of 25).299 Of course, both
numbers are small. When compared to each other, however, the
difference is noticeable. U.S. courts were 56% more likely to
Chang & Chang, supra note 162, at 437.
Id.
296 Id.
297 West, supra note 60, at 208.
298 Chang & Chang, supra note 162, at 426.
299 One case dealt with both Western and non-Western nations and so is
counted towards both totals.
294

295
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find that factor one (importance) favored upholding a Western
nation’s laws as compared to a non-Western nation’s laws.300
Results were similar for the other subjective factors.
Courts found that factor two (specificity) weighed in favor of
respecting Western nations’ laws 12.5% of the time (4 out of
32), but not a single court found factor two to weigh in favor of
non-Western nations. For factor four (availability of alternative
means), U.S. courts found the factor weighed in favor of
upholding Western nations’ laws in 15.6% of cases (5 out of 32),
but for non-Western nations, the result was 12% (3 out of 25).
Interestingly, the only subjective factor to show little
distinction between Western and non-Western nations’ laws
was factor five, which involves weighing the interests of the
United States and the foreign nation.301 At first glance, it would
seem that a factor focused directly upon weighing the United
States against foreign countries would be especially likely to
reveal subconscious biases against non-Western countries. It
may be, however, that when courts weighed the United States
interest against specific nations, the court was more conscious
of the danger of bias and was therefore more careful to avoid it.
At this point in time, the results for any given factor are merely
suggestive of bias. More results are needed before it can be
determined that there is indeed a statistical significance in the
treatments of Western and non-Western nations.302 The chart
immediately below shows the results for each of the four
subjective factors. (Factor three is excluded from the chart
because it is an objective factor, and as such, its results would
not be impacted by any biases of the courts.)

To put it another way, 12.5% is 156% of 8%.
For factor five (balancing national interests), the percentage of courts
finding that the factor weighed in favor of upholding foreign law was similar for
Western nations (17.2% or 5.5 out of 32) and for non-Western nations (16% or 4 out of
25). See Chart II, infra. Note that one case dealt with two Western nations and found
that factor five favored violating foreign law for one (France) but not the other
(Switzerland). I have counted this split verdict as 0.5.
302 When the results for all four subjective factors are added together, courts
found a factor to weigh in favor of the laws of a Western nation 18.5 times out of a total
of 128 possible occasions. By contrast, courts found a subjective factor to weigh in favor
of the laws of a non-Western nation 9 times out of a total of 100 possible occasions.
Therefore, a court was 61% more likely to find that any given subjective factor weighed
in favor of a Western nation’s laws as compared to a non-Western nation’s laws.
However, it is not yet possible to determine that this difference in results is
statistically significant.
300
301
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Chart II: Do U.S. Courts’ Analyses of the Subjective
Factors Display Pro-Western Bias?
Percentage of Cases Not Ordering Violations of Foreign Law
Percentage
NonSubjective
Western
Difference (Western
Western
Factor
Nations
Versus NonNations
Western Nations)
Factor One:
12.5%
8%
56% greater
Importance
Factor Two:
Specificity
Factor Four:
Alternative
Means
Factor Five:
National
Interests
Overall
Percentage of
All Subjective
Factors
D.

12.9%

0%

Incalculably greater
percentage

15.6%

12%

30% greater

17.2%

16%

7.5% greater

14.5%
9%(9/100)
(18.5/128)303

61% greater

Impact on U.S. Business and Foreign Respect for U.S.
Laws

The Aérospatiale five-factor test is problematic for many
reasons. U.S. courts exhibit a pro-forum (and perhaps pro-Western)
bias.304 There has been a snowball effect of more and more litigants
demanding court-ordered law breaking.305 Courts have often
forced parties and sometimes even nonparties “to make such a
Hobson’s choice” between flouting the U.S. court order and the
foreign law.306 A separate problem is the effect of court-ordered
violations upon the U.S. business environment. These decisions
“discourage . . . banks or other businesses from setting up in the
United States out of fear that United States court orders would
force them to violate either domestic or foreign law.”307
303 One case dealt with two Western nations and reached a split verdict,
finding that factor five favored violating foreign law for France but not Switzerland.
See supra note 300.
304 See supra Sections III.B, III.C, III.E, IV.C.
305 See supra Section IV.A.
306 West, supra note 60, at 222.
307 Id.
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Particularly troubling is that foreign governments may
turn U.S. court behavior against the United States and demand
the production of documents and records in violation of U.S. law.
The Aérospatiale dissent recognized that it did “not serve the
country’s long-term interest to establish precedents that could
allow foreign courts to compel production of the records of
American corporations.”308 The dissent highlighted the danger
that foreign governments and judiciaries may require American
technological and military secrets to be turned over.309 Linked to
this danger was the “price tag of accumulating resentment” as
U.S. courts invaded the sovereignty and violated the laws of
foreign nations.310 Commentators warned that “[j]udicial
insensitivity by United States courts has caused hostility abroad
which may lead to . . . problems for American litigants in foreign
tribunals.”311 Nevertheless, it has taken more than a decade for
the “accumulating resentment” to reach a critical mass.
Foreign courts have recently begun to order document
production in violation of U.S. law, perhaps in response to the
ongoing disrespect by U.S. courts for foreign sovereignty. In early
2015, a court in the United Kingdom ordered the production of a
document that had been filed under seal by a U.S. court.312 The
document at issue would reveal “an ongoing investigation by the
U.S. [Department of Justice],”313 and its production would flout
the clear mandate of both the U.S. court and the Department of
Justice. The U.K. court’s strange logic and its dismissiveness
towards U.S. law and U.S. concerns strongly resemble the
attitudes of U.S. courts towards foreign law when applying the
Aérospatiale test.
The document at issue in Property Alliance Group was a
Deferred Prosecution Agreement between the Royal Bank of
Scotland and the Department of Justice filed under seal by Judge
Shea in the District of Connecticut.314 The document itself stated
that it was “the focus of an ongoing investigation,” that it “will be
held in confidence by the parties to this agreement,” and that it
“will not be made available to the public unless and until the
Department of Justice, in its sole discretion, determines that such

308 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, at 552 n.3 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
309 Id.
310 Id. at 568.
311 See Wilson, supra note 176, at 604 (citation omitted).
312 Prop. All. Grp. Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2015] EWHC 321 (Ch.).
313 Id.
314 Id.
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information can and should be disclosed.”315 The Royal Bank of
Scotland informed the U.K. court that “the document is to be kept
under seal” and that producing it would put the bank “at risk of
criminal contempt proceedings.”316 The Department of Justice
confirmed to the U.K. court “the order of Judge Shea placing the
document under seal” and also emphasized its ongoing “interest
in maintaining the confidentiality of the information” in the
document.317
Despite the clear language of the court and the
Department of Justice, the U.K. court required the document to
be revealed to an opposing litigant.318 In doing so, the U.K. court
accepted a highly questionable assertion by a U.S. attorney
claiming that when a U.S. court seals a document, it does not
prohibit a party from distributing copies of that sealed
document.319 In language reminiscent of many court decisions
applying the Aérospatiale five-factor test, the U.K. court claimed
that the document’s supposed importance weighed in favor of its
release. Much like U.S. courts that weigh national interests,
evaluate foreign sovereigns’ interests in their own laws, and
question whether foreign laws are really enforced, the U.K. court
concluded that the U.S. court would not punish release of the
document. The U.K. court also refused the Royal Bank of
Scotland’s plea that the other party should be the one to inform
the U.S. court that the sealed document was being revealed.320
And to top it all off, the U.K. court stated that, based on “the
balance of factors,” it would “likely” release the sealed document
to the general public.321 This same U.K. court stated that its next
step would be to consider possibly ordering the production of
certain documents in violation of U.S. attorney-client privilege.322
It is perhaps easier to recognize the monstrosity of proforum bias and disrespect for foreign law when it is directed at
one’s own nation. The example of this U.K. court’s disrespect for
Id.
Id.
317 Id.
318 Prop. All. Grp. Ltd. v. The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2015] EWHC 321 (Ch.).
319 Id. The U.S. attorney claimed that “the seal order prevents RBS from publicly
disclosing the stamped filed copy . . . (i.e. the court record)” but that Royal Bank of Scotland
is not prevented from disclosing “RBS’ own copy . . . , the one it obtained from the US
Government prior to entry of the seal order.” This highly questionable assertion was made
by Jonathan New of Baker & Hostetler. Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. (“A year from now, when the case is approaching trial, . . . I regard it likely
that the balance of factors when considering whether a document like [this] should be
referred to in open court at trial is much more likely to come down in favour of
publicity . . . .”).
322 Id.
315
316
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U.S. sovereignty and court orders will hopefully cause U.S. courts
to reflect upon their own willingness to order law breaking
abroad. If not, the lack of comity displayed by U.S. courts will
likely lead to more foreign courts ordering the violation of U.S.
protective orders and attorney-client privilege and the release of
sealed court documents. Such a result would have enormous
ramifications for the U.S. legal system.
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE REGIME

As this article demonstrates, courts have utterly failed to
avoid pro-forum bias in applying the Aérospatiale test. So what
should be done? There are two alternatives. The Aérospatiale test
could be retained if U.S. trial courts correct their pro-forum
excesses. I provide suggestions in this regard below. Alternatively,
if courts are inherently unable to neutrally balance U.S. and
foreign laws, then the Aérospatiale test should be rejected and
replaced with a Hague Convention first approach.
A.

Reforming the Aérospatiale Test

To retain the Aérospatiale test, it is necessary to reform
the excesses inherent in courts’ application of the test.
1. Factor Four Must Be an Objective Test
As discussed above, the fourth factor (availability of
alternative means of obtaining the information) was apparently
intended as an objective factor. This factor asks whether or not
there exist alternative means by which the information sought
can be obtained. U.S. trial courts have improperly converted this
into a subjective factor, whereby the U.S. courts evaluate whether
or not they deem the alternative means satisfactory. Factor four
should be returned to the objective factor it was meant to be.
Specifically, factor four should always weigh against the violation
of foreign laws as long as there is an alternative means of
obtaining the information (whether that is a Hague Convention
request or another method).
2. “Specificity” Must Mean “Narrowly Tailored”
As previously discussed, many courts have interpreted the
second factor (specificity) as asking whether the document
requests are clear as to the documents sought. This is a
misreading of the word “specificity.” Court must recognize that
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the “specificity” factor requires document requests to be narrowly
tailored and targeted. Document requests are not tailored if they
are made as part of a fishing expedition or if the requesting party
is demanding huge quantities of documents.
3. Courts Must Reject—Not Pare Back—Overly Broad
Requests
Courts have frequently taken up the task of narrowing
overly broad document requests to a level the court deems
acceptable. Courts that unilaterally narrow requests are effectively
encouraging overly broad requests while also turning factor two
(specificity) into a rubber stamp for violating foreign laws. An
overly broad request must be deemed as weighing against the
violation of foreign laws and rejected, not pared back.
4. When Weighing National Interests, the U.S. Interest
in Adjudication Must Not Be a Consideration
Courts have vastly overvalued the supposed U.S. national
interest in adjudication when applying factor five (weighing
national interests). Considering that every court applying the
Aérospatiale test is necessarily applying it in the midst of a
litigation, the supposed U.S. national interest in adjudication
would automatically be triggered every time. If the supposed
interest in adjudication is so great that it outweighs foreign
nations’ interests in their laws, then the fifth factor (comparing
national interests) would always weigh in favor of violating
foreign law. It would be a perverse result for a supposed
balancing test if one of the factors came out the same way every
time. Courts must cease treating the “U.S. interest in
adjudication” as an interest to consider when weighing national
interests. To the extent there is a U.S. interest in adjudication,
this interest is already baked into the test and must not be
considered as part of the fifth factor.
If courts implement these changes to the Aérospatiale test,
then it may be possible to rescue the test from its current swamp
of pro-forum bias.
B.

Replacing the Aérospatiale Test with a Hague
Convention First Approach

While the reforms outlined above could help eliminate proforum bias, one fears that that pro-forum bias would eventually
creep back into the judicial process. The Supreme Court’s original
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Aérospatiale opinion repetitively and vocally urged trial courts to
avoid pro-forum bias, and yet pro-forum bias has not only
appeared, it has neutered Aérospatiale’s supposed balancing test.
U.S. courts are so infected with pro-forum bias that any attempt
to reform the Aérospatiale test may end up reverting back to the
current levels of bias.
An alternative system was proposed to the Supreme Court
in the Aérospatiale litigation itself: a Hague Convention first
approach. Under this approach, litigants would be required to at
least attempt to obtain documents through the Hague
Convention. Only if this attempt was unsuccessful (or if the
foreign nation has not joined the Convention) could the litigant
then seek a court order for the production of the documents in
violation of foreign law. Under this approach, the Aérospatiale
test would still be applied, but it would only come into play if the
Hague Convention request fails (or if the foreign nation is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention).
CONCLUSION
A review of all cases applying the five-factor Aérospatiale
test reveals evidence of pro-forum bias. U.S. courts have found
that each of the four subjective factors weigh in favor of violating
foreign law by lopsided ratios as high as thirteen to one. These
extreme results suggest that the warnings of pro-forum bias
expressed by the Aérospatiale dissent and by commentators have
proven correct. Moreover, results to date suggest that U.S. courts
may have a further bias against non-Western nations.
The first Aérospatiale factor, “importance,” is frequently
converted by courts into a “relevance” test. Even courts that don’t
reduce “importance” to relevance still take an extremely broad
view of importance. The second factor, “specificity,” is often
misunderstood by courts as referring to whether or not discovery
requests are clearly written. Even when properly understood as
asking whether requests are “narrowly tailored,” courts regularly
approve broad discovery requests as “specific.” The sole objective
factor is factor three, the national origin of the information
sought. This objective factor can act as a control group by which to
test the degree of pro-forum bias displayed by courts when
analyzing the subjective factors. The difference in results between
the objective factor (6% of cases favor violating foreign law) and
the subjective factors (between 81% and 93% of cases favor
violating foreign law) is extreme.
Factor four (whether alternative means are available)
should be an objective factor. Instead, most courts convert this

238

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

factor into a subjective test, and courts consistently find court
orders preferable to every alternative means of obtaining
information. Factor five requires the weighing of U.S. and
foreign interests. U.S. courts repeatedly confess that they do not
understand the foreign interests at stake, underappreciating
even interests enshrined in foreign constitutions. U.S. courts are
particularly prone to underestimating the importance of
financial privacy, which is a national interest across the globe.
Courts are also prone to overvaluing their own role, with many
declaring that a supposed U.S. interest in “adjudicating” court
cases trumps foreign laws.
The overwhelming pro-forum bias of U.S. courts has
encouraged litigants to demand documents in violation of foreign
law. The result is abusive discovery that traps entities between
conflicting legal requirements and sometimes forces unwarranted
settlements. Requests for court-ordered foreign law breaking have
skyrocketed, and the willingness of courts to order foreign law
breaking has led to discovery abuse as litigation strategy.
Pro-forum bias, the lack of appellate correction, the trend
towards using court-ordered law breaking as a litigation strategy,
and U.S. deference to legal precedent have combined to create a
terrible feedback loop. The once unheard-of scenario of courts
ordering the violation of foreign law has grown exponentially in
recent years. The willingness of U.S. courts to order foreign law
breaking has damaged international comity, infuriated foreign
sovereigns, and led to retaliatory actions. Aérospatiale’s
experiment in letting trial courts “weigh” the importance of U.S.
discovery against the importance of foreign law is a failure.
There are two potential solutions. Courts could rein in
some of the abuses of the Aérospatiale test. A better solution,
however, would be to require litigants to first attempt to obtain
documents through the Hague Convention. The Aérospatiale test
should come into play only when a Hague Convention request
has been rejected or when the foreign nation is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention.
The very idea of U.S. courts ordering entities to break the
law should shock the conscience. And yet the Aérospatiale test has
caused an enormous surge in court-ordered law breaking. The
test must be either corrected or scrapped. After all, the first step
in ending court-ordered law breaking is to stop ordering it.

